General Nambiar & the breakup of the state
 

Gen. Nambiar’s report concerning the possibility of resettling civilians within certain areas of the northeast of Sri Lanka now designated High Security Zones may be available to the public soon. Gen. Nambiar has had a good deal of experience in areas of the world engaged in internal conflict. This experience is relevant in previewing the possibility that his report will recommend changes to the status quo. Gen. Nambiar’s writings on his Bosnian experience, his feelings toward Pakistan and his concern for the unity of India, particularly, lead one to predict unfortunately that he will choose to emphasize the security concerns of the central government over the needs of civilians in his report on Sri Lanka. 

This essay will look first at the issue of the High Security Zones and will then turn to Gen. Nambiar’s previous military postings and how these may relate to his report on Sri Lanka that is expected out soon.

When the Sri Lankan armed forces first started being stationed on a permanent basis in the Northeast during the 1960s, camps were established to accomodate them. These camps grew in number and size throughout the ensuing years. In the early 1990s there were over 200 camps in the Northeast, while today it is estimated that there are 400 or more. The buffer zones considered required for these camps to protect them against attack kept growing. In the early 1990s the camp and airfield at Palaly, north of Jaffna City, expanded its protective buffer by thousands of hectares taking over a heavily populated agricultural zone and expelling the inhabitants. Between 15,000 and 30,000 families were displaced with no compensation. Rather than calling these areas ‘camps,’ they were designated ‘high security zones.’

In the February 22, 2002 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) "high security zones" are mentioned only once, in paragraph 2.2, which says "Places of worship which are situated in "high security zones" shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public."

With the ceasefire agreement came a period of military consolidation, most noticed on the Jaffna Peninsula, in which these high security zones were formalized and expanded. These zones and camps now comprise between 25 and 30% of the land area of the peninsula. (www.tamilguardian.com/tg193/jaffna_hsz.jpg) Of the 45 Grama Sevaka Niladhari Divisions (GSN, an administrative unit in which a village services officer is stationed) in Jaffna, 28 divisions are completely designated as high security zones and 5 are partly so designated. New zones continue to be created, particularly in the east.

A view of a high security zone in the northern Jaffna peninsula. (Frontline, 3/16/03)

Because these zones frequently involved displacement of the civilian population in their creation, always without compensation or resettlement, the former inhabitants are, naturally, anxious to return to their homes and occupations.

The Tamil Guardian has editorialized, "Sri Lanka’s obsessive focus on undermining the LTTE’s military capabilities whilst 40% of our people are prevented by the Sinhala military from returning to their homes justifiably raises suspicion of the government’s longer-term intent." (Jan. 28, 2003)

The issue of these high security zones has thus become a source of dispute in the peace negotiations between the GOSL and the LTTE.

At the fourth meeting of the peace negotiators in Bangkok in January, 2003, the Norwegian facilitators announced that "The second phase of the Action Plan will focus on resettlement of IDPs and refugees in areas within the High Security Zones, as and when they are released by the Security Forces for resettlement. For this purpose, the GOSL will carry out a review with the assistance of an internationally recognized military expert, taking into account relevant humanitarian and security needs." The LTTE acquiesced to postponing the resolution of this issue, probably because it threatened to derail the whole negotiation process unless contained. Lt. General Satish Nambiar (ret’d) was chosen to carry out the review of the High Security Zones for the GOSL.  His report, however, is not binding on either party.

There is some hint in recent news items that Gen. Nambiar’s report may be completed or near completion. It is therefore an appropriate time to ask, "Who is Gen. Nambiar?"

General Nambiar retired as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Indian Army and is now Director of the United Services Institution of India, a New Delhi thinktank which has several programs, one of which is to train UN peacekeepers. In between Gen. Nambiar was the First Force Commander and Head of Mission of the United Nations Forces deployed in the former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1993.

According to The Sunday Times (2/3/03), "Lt. Gen. Nambiar made two previous visits to Sri Lanka, one in September and the other in December, last year, both at the invitation of Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe.

"UNF Government sources who spoke on grounds of anonymity told The Sunday Times following these visits that Lt. Gen. Nambiar, handed over a ten-page report encompassing three different aspects. They related to the role of officer level cadres in the Army (under the proposed defence reforms), the working of High Security Zones and how their existing structure could be reviewed to facilitate the peace process and a possible long term incorporation of Tiger guerrilla cadres in the military/police when a fuller peace settlement is arrived at."

There has also been discussion of incorporating some of Sri Lanka’s enormous now-idle military into the UN’s peacekeeping operations.

Gen. Nambiar’s previous military experience will, of course, color his conclusions concerning the tradeoff between military and civilian claims to the land comprising the High Security Zones. 

Gen. Nambiar wrote about his experiences as head of the UN Force in the former Yugoslavia. In India he received accolades for "standing up to NATO" in his role as a UN peacekeeper. Gen. Nambiar's piece is entitled "The Fatal Flaws Underlying NATO’s Intervention in Yugoslavia" (http://www.diaspora-net.org/food4thought/nambiar.htm) and provides a window into his thinking concerning an ethnic conflict in which the validity of various claims must be determined. His premise is that neither side, the Bosnians or the Serbs, had right on their side, the Serbs were unnecessarily blamed for their actions, and it was his duty to remain ‘neutral’ and above the fray. His orientation towards that fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia leaks out in various forms, however.

"In my experience with similar situations in India in such places as Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Nagaland, and elsewhere, it is the essential strategy of those ethnic groups who wish to secede to provoke the state authorities...

It is appropriate to touch on the humanitarian dimension for it is the innocent who are being subjected to displacement, pain and misery. Unfortunately, this is the tragic and inevitable outcome of all such situations of civil war, insurgencies, rebel movements, and terrorist activity...

And finally, secessionist movements, which often start with terrorist activity, will get greater encouragement [from NATO’s actions to prevent atrocities in Bosnia]."

In none of these statements is Gen. Nambiar sympathetic to the ‘secessionist’ side - regardless of the history and human cost of the conflict - when its interests diverge from those of the ‘state authorities,’ nor does he expect anything less than human misery from efforts to stop one ethnic group dominating another.

Why would Gen. Nambiar chose a stand which, while ostensibly neutral, favored the Serbs whose belligerence was recognized by many observers as the main cause of much of the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia? David Reiff, a former reporter and New School University researcher, writes in The New Republic (2/12/96) "The first UNPROFOR commander, the Indian general Satish Nambiar, was regularly accused by UNHCR officials in 1993 of holding pro-Serb views. One senior official told me at the time 'When Nambiar looks at Izetbegovic, he sees Jinnah. For him, Izetbegovic [the Bosnian leader] is a man who ruined a perfectly good multiconfessional country, just as Jinnah ruined India in 1947 by insisting on a separate Pakistan.'"

According to Rieff, another, unnamed UNPROFOR official wrote, "'I will not conclude by naming the aggressor'." Rieff continues, "He implies that he declines to do this because he rejects such simplistic ascriptions of blame. What the UN never wanted to understand was that without such an analysis, all its actions in the former Yugoslavia led it not to impartiality or good works, but to collusion with aggression." (http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/~ross/bosnia_/un.txt, also posted at http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/febmar96/evil.cfm )

One is ever hopeful that an impartial report balancing the needs of displaced civilians and security considerations will be the end result of Gen. Nambiar’s investigations in Sri Lanka. The good general’s past history, however, leads one to believe that in this case he will almost inevitably determine that the requirements of the military and the state trump civilian concerns.

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N.B. Interestingly, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Japanese delegate to the Sri Lankan peace negotiations, was the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia just subsequent to Gen. Nambiar’s tenure.

 

                                                                               A.S.

                                                                               April, 2003