Who Are the Peace-Makers?

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signalled their withdrawal from the talks with President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge by attacking two naval boats in Trincomalee on 19 April 1995. The instant and generally widespread condemnation in the South was directed against the LTTE. The Colombo-based "peace lobby", Sinhala intelligentsia and People's Alliance (PA) Government propaganda all accused the LTTE of attempting to scuttle the peace process. It is alleged that LTTE feared peace. AGOTIC wishes to examine the truth, if any, behind these allegations.

The popular perception in the South is that Sinhala attitudes towards the Tamil question have changed for the better under the PA Government. But what catalysed the attitudinal change among the Sinhala people? The usual explanation given by pro-government sources is that the PA's policies influenced the Sinhala people to voluntarily accept that the war in the North-East Province (NEP) can be brought to an end only through a negotiated political solution. This new vision is alleged to be the result primarily of a moral imperative, of "good intentions" of some PA politicians. The assertions are an expression of faith, that President Kumaratunge is personally committed to peace and is genuinely seeking a political settlement.

But PA's policies were not formulated in a political vacuum. They are a reaction to, and an accommodation of, the new political mood, the peace climate, in the South which rejected the military option. And the policies were crafted with electoral gains in mind at the 1994 August parliamentary and November presidential elections. This brings one back to the original question: what created the peace climate in the South?

Political changes neither fall from the sky nor fortuitously appear as political clay in the hands of waiting politicians. The attitudinal change among the Sinhala people is the direct result of the relentless armed resistance of the LTTE, which exposed the successive Governments' repeated predictions of a military victory in the NEP as hollow and impotent political rhetoric. Those who believe that the LTTE is the principal obstacle to peace will find it instructive to recollect recent history. When Eelam War Two started in June 1990, war hysteria in the South reached unprecedented levels. Defeat of the LTTE was confidently predicted and eagerly awaited by even "progressives". The predictions of a military victory for the UNP government were made by these "analysts" on the following basis:

1. It was alleged that during the war between the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and LTTE (from October 1987 to March 1990), the IPKF had eroded the fighting capacity of the LTTE. The IPKF supposedly had decimated large numbers of LTTE's cadres, depleted its stocks of ammunition and supplies and disorganised its command structure.

2. It was believed that the LTTE's hostile reaction to the IPKF had undermined its political support in Tamil Nadu and its traditional supply routes in southern India.

3. It was assumed that LTTE had lost its "rear base" in India.

4. It was thought that the LTTE was weak, alone and cornered in the Jaffna Peninsula. The Sri Lankan Army and General Denzil Kobbekaduwa were expected to "crush" the LTTE within six months, by December 1990.

5. The armed forces themselves were flushed with success, having repressed the Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) between September 1988 and January 1990.

Confidence in the ability of armed forces to destroy the LTTE was so high among the general Sinhala population that 30,000 young men volunteered to join the Army in July 1990 even though the new intake was limited to about 5,000 men; and the queues outside the Army Headquarters stretched up to the Taj Samudra Hotel and beyond. While recognising that unemployment pushed many youths to join the armed forces, the general euphoria of an imminent military victory cannot be denied.

Not to be outdone, most of the Opposition parties (many of them are in Government today) had given ringing endorsements of President Premadasa's military campaign against the LTTE (Island, 8 July 1990, p.9).

The history of what happened after June 1990 is well known. The LTTE's successful armed resistance and sacrifices made by Tamils effectively neutralized the UNP Government's "military option" and discredited the Sinhala "hawks". It encouraged the Sinhala people to re-examine the nature and direction of the conflict in the NEP. A negotiated political settlement became relevant because the LTTE was not defeated in battle. Thus the LTTE and the Tamil people through their unrelenting struggle have been the principal architects of the peace climate. Indeed this peace climate provided the political space for the "peace lobby" and lent credibility to its interventions. The PA Government and President Kumaratunge rode to power on the same peace climate. Equally it is the countervailing power of the LTTE that is the best and only guarantee that the Government will be compelled to reach a negotiated settlement.

But those who view LTTE as an obstacle to peace argue that Velupillai Prabhakaran personally has little to gain from the peace process. If there is a negotiated settlement Prabhakaran, they claim, stands to lose much of his present power and influence. However, this argument was just as applicable before the parliamentary and presidential elections. But it was never raised then since President Kumaratunge's election campaign commitment to a negotiated settlement would have sounded hollow. Because if Prabhakaran has apparently nothing to gain from a negotiated settlement, what is the relevance of President Kumaratunge's "peace process"? So the doubts were NOT raised before the elections about Prabhakaran's willingness or the LTTE's ability to negotiate a political solution; and it was vigorously promised that Mrs Kumaratunge will put forward a peace package immediately after taking over as President.

Doubts were raised deliberately after the elections, about Prabhakaran's willingness to accept a negotiated solution. These opportunistic arguments could undermine the peace climate in the South and justify the continuation of the military option against the LTTE. They are also flat-footed attempts to mislead Tamils into believing that Prabhakaran is the major, if not the sole, obstacle to peace. The evident and naive intention is to isolate the LTTE from the Tamils, pit the Tamils against the LTTE and weaken LTTE's military capacity to resist.

If the countervailing power of the LTTE is eliminated then the compulsion upon President Kumaratunge and her Government to negotiate a political settlement will be removed. Thereafter President Kumaratunge will be free to impose a solution, after holding cosmetic talks with collaborationist Tamil politicians in Colombo. She may believe that the solution satisfied all communities but in fact it will prolong conflicts in the NEP.

Therefore, those who seek to undermine the LTTE's countervailing power in the interest of peace are in fact sabotaging the prospects for a negotiated political settlement. Because even an elementary grasp of political history reveals that genuine negotiations take place only between equals in power. Moreover, those in the south who believe they have sufficient political influence to substitute LTTE's countervailing power are suffering acute delusions of grandeur.

In this context, the "peace with democracy" slogan and the attempt to beat the LTTE with the democratic stick are positively obscene. Those who cry for democracy for Tamils in the North are cynically silent on democracy for Tamils in the South. Because the "peace lobby" and its Tamil members have done virtually nothing regarding the widespread and indiscriminate arrests of innocent Tamils by security forces in the South.

After 19 April, the LTTE has been criticised specifically for not giving more time for the "peace process" to take effect. But give more time for what? Should more time be given to the farcical Presidential delegation composed of private secretaries and personal friends? Should more time be given for further betrayals of promises to relax the economic embargo? Should more time be given to postpone the publication of the Government's peace package? In the Tamil perception, the integrity of the "peace process" has now been seriously eroded. It would be ludicrous to expect the LTTE to continue the peace talks without a fresh and genuine initiative from the PA Government.

The "peace lobby", President Kumaratunge or her Government need not seek to open a dialogue between the peoples of north and south, or go over anyone's head or feel compelled to perform other such political acrobatics. Their task is simple. Together they must put before the peoples of Sri Lanka a peace package, which had been promised eleven months ago by President Kumaratunge in her interview published in the Tamil newspaper Virakesari on the 1st of May last year (1994). AGOTIC has no doubt whatsoever that each day's delay by the Government in submitting a peace package will further reduce the scope for a political solution and surely justify the struggles for self-determination by minor nations.

Dr S Sathananthan Ph D
Secretary
24 April 1995