The United National Front (UNF) government is carrying on with the talks as though a political settlement to the conflict is possible. We have argued on many occasions in these columns that the fundamental provisions of the 1978 constitution will not permit any solution to the ethnic conflict that goes beyond the 13th Amendment in granting regional autonomy to the Tamil people.

Today we have sufficient reason to believe that the UNF leadership is fully aware of the fact that it is not possible at all to implement a settlement that can meet the ‘basic political aspirations’ of the Tamil people under the provisions of Sri Lanka’s constitution. If this is the case, how does the UNF see the future of the peace process?

Although we do not know what’s in the minds of UNF strategists who are handling the peace talks, we can safely venture to say that in theory and in practice they can, under the specific circumstance we have described here, expect the LTTE to get irreversibly inured to peace; build a strong and large peace constituency among the Tamils which the LTTE would increasingly be disinclined to oppose; expand the ‘democratic’ space in the northeast by encouraging diverse groups and parties to contest elections there in the future; ultimately make the LTTE ‘see’ or realise the futility of searching for a federal solution.

There are many parallels in other parts of the world where the condition of extended military stalemate (sometimes lasting over 2-3 generations) have impelled separatist movements to drop secession from the agenda of their peace talks with states; and long periods of negotiations and peace thereafter have induced them to settle within the status quo instead of insisting on a radical restructuring of the state in lieu secession.

The most current instance of this phenomenon is closer to home.

The Nagas in India’s northeast have been waging an armed struggle for an independent sovereign homeland for almost five decades. Nagaland was conquered by the British late in the 19th century and was annexed to India. The Nagas declared independence a day before the British formally granted India its freedom. Gandhi, however, convinced them to remain within the Indian union temporarily for ten years. He told them they would be free to leave at the end of the period.

But 10 years later Jawaharlal Nehru refused to honour Gandhi’s pledge and insisted that Nagaland was an inseparable part of the India. (Some of Gandhi’s detractors argue that he shrewdly bought time for India to prepare the ground for effectively opposing Naga independence).

The Nagas, being a war like people, began a ferocious armed struggle to achieve their freedom from Indian rule. The Indian army was sent in to crush the rebellion but it inevitably got mired in the longest counter insurgency campaign in the annals of modern warfare. The Indian armed forces have lost more soldiers in Nagaland than in Kashmir.

The Naga struggle acquired a cross border and trans national dimension as its militants set up training and supply bases in Burma amid allegations in India that they were getting support from China and Pakistan. Nevertheless, Indian counter-insurgency experts took the long-term view to eventually wear down the armed Naga separatists. In 1997, Delhi brought about a ceasefire and started a process to prepare the ground for peace talks with the Naga independence movement. In 2000, it unveiled a policy of rapprochement with Myanmar’s ruling Junta, with a view, among other things, to deny the Nagas their rear base.

Direct talks between Delhi and the Naga independence movement began this year in January when the leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland met Vajpayee. Delhi believes that the great majority of the people of Nagaland have been sufficiently convinced that war is futile, which in turn would act as a deterrent on Naga independence movement, preventing it from going back to war.

Delhi’s main aim, however, is to expand the ‘democratic’ space in Nagaland so that parties other than the Congress (I) would be able to contest elections for the state assembly there. Currently, the discredited Congress (I) led by S. C Jamir is the sole party in the Nagaland legislature. Congress (I) has none to oppose in the state assembly because all the militant groups of the Naga independence movement have been boycotting elections while regional parties and all Indian parties couldn’t find credible local candidates to contest the polls.

As a crucial aspect of the current peace deal, Delhi has got a commitment from the Nagas not to disrupt or call for a general boycott of any future election in the state. Counter-insurgency strategists in Delhi believe that this would encourage diverse parties and groups to contest elections to the state assembly and Parliament, thereby expanding the constituency of those in Nagaland who have a direct stake in the Indian Union or, in other words, the status quo.

The longer the Naga independence movement is locked in talks, the lesser would be the chances that the local population would countenance a return to war which, in turn, would create a suitable environment in Nagaland for expanding the constituency of direct stake holders in the Indian Union through elections and other means. If the number of these direct stake holders in the status quo and their support networks among the local populace expand sufficiently, then the compulsion in the Naga independence movement to insist on a radical restructuring of the Indian Union in lieu of Naga secession would be reduced to a negligible level, according to counter insurgency experts.

Then of course a long period of peace talks would offer inevitable opportunities for Indian intelligence agencies to widen direct contacts and engineer splits in the movement, buy over leaders, subject the Naga population to peace time psyops, foster ethnic and tribal divisions, induce corruption in the ranks of the militant groups etc.,

In the same manner Indian counter insurgency experts succeeded in containing the two decade long armed struggle by the Mizo people to establish the independent state of Mizoram and in eventually co-opting Mizo secessionists into the Indian Union.

Delhi first brought about a military stalemate in Mizoram, then locked the Mizo independence movement into prolonged peace talks, induced it to drop the demand for a separate state and, later, its demand for a radical restructuring of the Indian state and eventually inveigled the Mizo leadership into accepting a solution within the parameters of the Indian constitution.

Given the specific circumstances in which the peace talks between the LTTE and the United National Front government are taking place, the application of a parallel strategy on the part of the Sri Lankan state and its international backers appears inevitable.

As we have reiterated, it is apparently quite clear to the UNF leadership and its constitutional experts that a federal solution to settle the conflict cannot be granted in any form within the parameters of Sri Lanka’s constitution.

Therefore in continuing the talks without acknowledging this reality, the UNF is obviously and inexorably committing itself to the well tested strategy for containing and co-opting a separatist insurgent movement into the status quo, sans any radical restructuring of the state.

The only hitch in all this, however, is that the UNF and its backers seem to often forget that they are dealing with the LTTE, which is a different kettle of fish

Courtesy: TamilCanadian

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Nagaland

Lessons of the Past

by Ram Narayan Kumar

The ceasefire agreement be tween the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), anounced by prime minister IK Gujral on 24 July 1997, is more than four years old. The agreement promised to bring about a lasting political solution to this long-drawn-out conflict through unconditional dialogue at the highest political level to be conducted in a neutral country. A set of ground rules and modalities to implement them, finalised on 12 December 1997 and further revised on 13 January 2001, aimed to facilitate the negotiations on politically substantive issues that underlie the five decades’ long war.

A number of basic questions occur even as we try to evaluate the agreement at the end of its four tumultuous years: What progress has the promise of dialogue made in this period? Is there sufficient transparency in the process? Have both the sides been observing the ground rules, in letter and spirit? Has the Ceasefire Monitoring Group, set up to supervise adherence to these ground rules and to investigate complaints of their violations, been functioning effectively? Has the ceasefire brought respite from the violence and unremitting harassments, that has been the Nagas’ lot over the past 50 years? Do they feel sufficiently relieved to acquire a stake in its continuance?

A central problem of the ceasefire agreement was that it did not include revocation of draconian laws, such as the Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1953, Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962, Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, and Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 1955, which allow the security forces to violate fundamental rights with impunity on the pretext of countering insurgency. With such laws still in force the role of the army and the paramilitary during the operation of the ceasefire was never really clarified. Given that there was a civil administration functioning under normal constitutional law and a security administration operating under special laws, the subordination of the military to civil authority and the legal demarcation of respective roles was a precondition for the success of the ceasefire. This issue itself arose from the related question of the state government’s role in a ceasefire agreement between  the Union of India and an insurgent group in the state. How do its agencies go about their law and order functions without jeopardising the special terms of the agreement?

There were two other aspects of the situation crucial to the efficacy of the ceasefire. For one, the attitude of the other insurgent groups and factions involved in the long war with India, who have not been included in the agreement, is vital to the maintenance of peace. And  to what extent are civil society organisations uncontaminated by the violence, involved in the process of finding a just peace? If the 1997 ceasefire was in limbo, it was precisely because the modalities of the agreement failed to address these fundamental issues.

But there were also other specific grievances. In the four years since the peace process formally began, dialogue made no progress because the NSCN(IM) insisted on  universal coverage of the ceasefire, which the Union Government had been unable to enforce after initially promising it. General Atem and P. Shimrang in Dimapur, two main representatives of the NSCN(IM) in the region, made it clear during discussions that unless the government of India kept its pledge there was no point in continuing with the ceasefire. On 8 May 2001, the Ministry of Home Affairs confirmed receiving an ultimatum from Isak Chishi Swu, chairman of the NSCN(IM) and Thuingaleng Muivah, its general secretary, threatening to withdraw from the peace-process if the government of India failed to honour its commitment to extend the cease-fire to “all the Naga areas”. Seemingly, this threat had an effect.

On 20 May 2001, The Indian Express reported that the prime minister’s representative was leaving for Bangkok for talks with the leaders of the NSCN(IM). The report also indicated that the chief ministers of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, the other states affected by the Naga question, had agreed to include the Naga-populated areas of their states within the ceasefire zone. One day before their scheduled meeting in Bangkok, the People’s Front government in Manipur collapsed after being defeated in a confidence motion tabled by chief minister Radhabinod Koijam.  Koijam belonged to the Samata Party, a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance running the  Union Government. The state then came under President’s rule. An editorial comment in The Statesman on 28 May 2001, indicated that the fall had been engineered to facilitate the extension of the Naga ceasefire to the Manipur areas since Koijam’s government was vociferously opposing it.

The negotiations in Bangkok yielded results. On 14 June 2001, the Union Home Secretary, Kamal Pande, announced that it has been agreed to extend the ceasefire for one more year without territorial limits.  In response, a large number of Manipuri political groups including the Samata Party, Manipur People’s Party, All Manipur United Clubs Organisation (AMUCO) and All Manipur Students’ Union (AMSU) said that they were against the extension and would oppose it. The Congress chief minister of Assam also voiced the same sentiment. The ostensible concern was the territorial integrity of other Northeastern states since the NSCN(IM) was laying claim to the Naga-inhabited hill areas. 

The Bangkok agreement was a belated recognition of the argument that the peace process, in order to be meaningful, had to be comprehensive, that its objectives could not be accomplished if the antagonists seek an accord in one state while remaining belligerent in other areas.  The extension also suggested total abjuration of violence by both the sides and the restoration of a rational process to resolve political differences. It presupposed accountability, the end of impunity, and the repeal of ‘black laws’ such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. In this sense, the June extension of the ceasefire opened the way to a just peace for all the people in the Northeast. But the violent agitation for its repeal in the other states has added a new twist to the process.

AMUCO and AMSU called for a three-day strike in Manipur to protest against  the extension of the ceasefire. The popular agitation, although limited to the valley of Imphal, became extremely violent. On the third day of the strike, mobs stormed the government buildings and torched the State Assembly building after assaulting several legislators and former ministers.  The police had to open fire to stop the unruly crowds from invading the house of Radhabinod Koijam, the outgoing chief minister of the state. This resulted in several deaths. Despite the imposition of curfew, violent protests continued.

Naga organisations showed sensitivity to the emerging situation. The All Naga Students’ Association of Manipur (ANSAM), the Naga Women’s  Union of Manipur (NWUM) and the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights mourned the deaths in the police firing. They issued a statement appealing to all “Meitei brethren” and the Naga population in the state to “maintain communal harmony at this critical juncture”. “The  need of the hour is peace and dialogue among ourselves,” the statement emphasised. Thuingaleng Muivah clarified that the agreement to a universal ceasefire with the Government of India “deals only with the ceasefire, nothing beyond that. The declaration of a ceasefire is not against anyone and it does not deal with territorial limits.” He further explained, “We have agreed not to fight in any part of India or Asia or anywhere. There is no reason for anyone else to interpret it more that that.” The Naga HoHo, the apex body of all Naga tribal councils, convened a special meeting to consider the situation. Its statement pointed out that the violent protests in Imphal Valley “revealed the extremely complicated and sensitive challenges the Nagas face to evolve a workable solution with our neighbours. Ultimately, we need a settlement that will ensure security, stability and peace for ourselves and for our neighbours. Our actions will decide whether we develop and survive together in a changing world or drag one another down to a common hell of perpetual animosity and violence, which can only be destructive to all.” The statement called on the Nagas not to “ignore or treat lightly the intensity and depth of our neighbours’ insecurity about their future”, and went on to suggest that the leaders of both the communities should sit together and find a common approach to deal with the controversy.

These statements from the Naga organisations, however, did not mollify the protesters and the violent agitation continued. Thousands of Nagas fled Imphal Valley to the safety of the hills. On 27 July, the Home Minister of India told reporters that the government had decided to rescind the Bangkok agreement and to once again limit the ceasefire to the state of Nagaland. According to him, the leaders of NSCN(IM) were agreeable to the decision.  The crowds in Imphal celebrated the announcement.

V.S. Atem, the seniormost leader of the NSCN(IM) in the region, issued a stern warning that his organisation “cannot be a party to any ceasefire that is restricted only to the State of Nagaland”. He denied the home minister’s claim that his organisation had endorsed the annulment of the extension. In a separate statement faxed to the Press Trust of India from Amsterdam, Swu and Muivah said that they have not agreed to the government’s decision to rescind the 14 June Bangkok agreement. The statement said: “Of course, both sides believed that better understanding could certainly be arrived at in the course of talks... Therefore, any announcement, declaration or statement given by the Home Ministry are unfounded.  They are in no sense acceptable to the Nagas.”

Does the lay reader, who daily scans through newspapers and probably also watches television, understand why this trend of events is not favourable for the prospects of peace in the region? Does he or she sufficiently emphathise with our forebodings that history may repeat its vicious cycle unless civil society develops an informed aversion to its inveteracy and forges a collective will to break free? One needs to become aware of the content of Naga history because there is no other way of understanding the mechanisms and compulsions which, again and again, drive people back into blunder. History tells us of the evils of doctrinaire intransigence, and so too of the dangers inherent in compromises that are born of fear and greed, or foisted on unsuspecting people by stealth and deception. If repetition of our past tragedies is to be avoided, it is necessary to not only expose the falsehoods of the victors, but also puncture the myths of innocence that the vanquished all too easily develop to  conceal  their failings.

Jayaprakash Narayan resigned from the Peace Mission in February 1966 after the Naga underground expressed lack of confidence in his impartiality. The ceasefire agreement between the two recalcitrant parties was made to last till September 1972 because the logic of ‘peaceful’ attrition had taken over. Minoo R. Masani, the leader of a parliamentary delegation to Nagaland in February 1965, said: “As the weeks and months pass, peace brings with it a relaxation of tensions. This involves, insofar as the village population is concerned, a freer expression of opinion and a greater assertiveness against the demands and exactions of the (underground) ‘Naga Federal Government’. Now that the Indian army no longer operates, the villages are turning to the state administration and the Indian army for protection against the underground. Fear is diminishing. People do not wish to pay taxes endlessly to the ‘Naga Federal Government’… So far as the underground is concerned, a long period of peace must involve a measure of disintegration. The men from the jungles are going home to the villages to eat and sleep with their families. They taste the joys and comforts of domestic life. This is something that Mao Tsetung’s rules of guerrilla warfare do not permit of. Those who have talked to small groups of Naga underground men find, in private conversation, that they are already becoming more reasonable and there is no desire to go back to the jungles…”

Even as the ceasefire agreement declared on 25 July 1997 is already four years old, and no substantive progress has been made in negotiations, these words of complacency are being heard all over again. No doubt, the Naga people want peace and the men languishing in the jungles long for simple domestic pleasures.

However, if we do not reach the source of their discontent which brought them to the path of war with India, their political recalcitrance may soon reassert itself. As for the Naga warriors and their leaders, they will hopefully recognise what their movement at all its twists and turns, has been doing to their people. Those who waste themselves in the pursuit of utopias can probably contribute no more to history than others who apathetically resign themselves to a self-perpetuating status quo.

Then and only then will history cease to be the dead-weight it has been until now.

Himal, September, 2001

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