HOW TO KILL A TIGER: MEASURING MANWARING'S PARADIGM AGAINST SRI LANKA'S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies

By

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Washington, DC
November 16, 2010
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ABSTRACT

Sri Lanka was brutalized by a Tamil insurgency that lasted for nearly three decades, led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. This paper seeks to understand how Sri Lankan strategy evolved such that after several campaigns which ended with the government's defeat, it was ultimately able to prevail. Max Manwaring, a research professor of military strategy at the US Army War College, provides some insight. He suggests that success occurs when the following components are present in a government's counterinsurgency effort: (1) legitimacy; (2) unity of effort; (3) discipline and capability of the military; (4) type and consistency of external support to the host government; (5) ability to cut international support to the insurgents; and (6) the role of intelligence and information operations. Furthermore, he explains that to the extent these components are strongly present, they favor success. But if any of these elements are absent or present in a weak form, the probability for success is negligible.

This project exploits the case variation within the Sri Lankan war by dividing the conflict into 5 campaigns between 1983 and 2009. Due to page limitations, the study applies the paradigm to each of the final two counterinsurgency campaigns to determine if it has any explanatory power for the government's victory. The two campaigns
selected for this study were: Eelam War III (1995-2001) and the period incorporating the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) and Eelam War IV (2002-09). The paper determined that Manwaring’s components were present in a weak form during the former campaign and strongly present in the latter. Logically, we can infer that Manwaring’s Paradigm possesses explanatory power for the Sri Lankan government's success against the LTTE. Manwaring's framework may also have implications for other nations engaged in their own counterinsurgency effort.
The research and writing of this thesis
is dedicated to everyone who helped along the way.

Many thanks,
Christine C. Fair
Jack Gill
Dolores Tozzi
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INTRODUCTION

This research seeks to understand how Sri Lankan strategy evolved such that after several campaigns which ended with the government's defeat, it was ultimately able to prevail. In order to address this question, I will exploit the variation within the Sri Lankan case by dividing the conflict into 5 campaigns or phases. The first, commonly referred to as Eelam War I, ranged from 1983-1987; the second phase saw the introduction of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from 1987-1990; Eelam War II, the third phase, erupted when the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka in 1990 and concluded with peace negotiations in 1995; the fourth, Eelam War III, began in 1995 after the negotiations failed and continued until a Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) was initiated in 2001; the fifth and last phase, spanning from 2002 to 2009, incorporates the CFA and Eelam War IV—the final war leading to the Tiger’s defeat. The study then applies Manwaring’s Paradigm (discussed in detail below) to the fourth and fifth campaigns to determine if the model possesses explanatory power for the government’s victory.

The implications of this study are important for several reasons. One is that Sri Lanka is a current example of successful counterinsurgency effort. Understanding Colombo’s methods for destroying the LTTE apparatus may offer recommendations for other nations engaged in their own domestic counterinsurgency struggle. It may also offer suggestions for how U.S. policy makers can better assist allies fighting domestic
insurgents. If Manwaring’s framework cannot fully explain the government’s victory, it can be adjusted for future situations.

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The following chapter provides a brief overview of the conflict in Sri Lanka. The second details the data and research methods involved in this project. Chapter three is dedicated to the review of Eelam War III, in which the six variables of Manwaring’s Paradigm will comprise subsections. Each subsection will address the Sri Lankan experience in respect to the corresponding variable. Chapter four examines the Sri Lankan effort during the CFA and Eelam War IV, its structure is identical to chapter four. Chapter five deliberately compares the two periods to assess the degree to which Manwaring’s elements were present. The final chapter will review lessons from the case and discuss potential policy implications.

**CHAPTER 1: CONFLICT BACKGROUND**

Sri Lanka is a pear shaped island nation located off India’s southeastern coast. The Portuguese were the first to colonize the island’s coastal regions in the 16th century and were followed by the Dutch in the 18th century. But it was the British who succeeded in conquering the entirety of the nation in 1815. However, the British quickly experienced difficulties in flagging the influence of Buddhist monks within the country’s majority Sinhalese community.¹ In order to counter the monks’ influence, the

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British implemented their "divide-and-rule" tactic and began paying favor to the country's largest minority population, the Tamils.

The Tamils soon found themselves benefiting from the educational system established by British missionaries and receiving preferential treatment for jobs and positions in the colonial government. Although Sri Lanka would not stage a revolution against the British, like its northern neighbor, the majority Sinhalese community grew increasingly frustrated with their growing marginalization. Initially, anti-British sentiment fueled Sinhalese nationalism. But when Sri Lanka was granted independence in 1948, Sinhalese political ideology shifted its animosity for colonialism towards the Tamil people.

By the time the British departed the island, the Tamils (who comprise 17% of Sri Lanka's population) had achieved a high degree of social status and held prominent positions in important sectors of life, like education and medicine.\(^2\) However, the Tamil situation would soon change. Sri Lanka had a parliamentary government modeled after the British system whose "mechanisms" remained in place after independence. Mark Thomas explains that "it was these mechanisms…controlling a highly centralized, unitary state, that assured domination of the polity" by the Buddhist Sinhalese community that made up almost 75% of the island's population.\(^3\)

Numerous Sinhala administrations implemented measures to reverse decades of British policies and favoritism towards the Tamils. The most divisive were the "Sinhala-

\(^3\) Marks, T (2007) Pg 485
only” language act of 1956, university laws requiring Tamil students to achieve higher grades to qualify for admission, and the construction of a new constitution in 1972 that "gave the foremost place to Buddhism." As a result, many Tamils lost their social status and found it increasingly more difficult to obtain work. It is important to highlight that while religion plays a part in the war, most Sri Lankans believe the conflict is rooted in the redress (or lack thereof) of ethnic and political grievances.4

Despite the intermittent riot from time to time, Tamil society initially pursued political methods for solving their growing dilemma. But the intransigence of successive administrations to rectify Tamil injustices provided the impetus for many to take up arms against the Sinhala government. Although signs of Tamil militancy can be observed as early as the 1950's, it wasn't until the mid to late 1970's that a discernable insurgency began to arise. The organizations, which included: the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the People's Liberation Organization for Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), were not only engaged in a power struggle against the government, but against each other as well. In 1983, the Sri Lankan Army was deployed to deal with the strengthening insurgency as calls for more autonomy evolved into demands for secession and armed rebellion grew progressively more violent.

The LTTE emerged from the Tamil New Tigers, the militant youth wing of the Tamil political party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). By 1990, under the

leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE had established itself as the sole Tamil military power. By 2002, the Tigers were responsible for two-thirds of all suicide bombings in the world and would become the only insurgent group to ever maintain an army, navy, and air force.\textsuperscript{5} Although the men and women of the LTTE would wage a war for an independent homeland with an indiscriminate and calculating brutality, their longevity and potency would soon prove ephemeral. The map on the following page lays out the geography of the island nation.

\textsuperscript{5} Gunaratna, R. (May 2002) Frontline World interview, extracted from http://www.pbs.org
CHAPTER 2: DATA & METHODS

There has been a plethora of material pertaining to counterinsurgency strategies published over the last several decades and even more with the advent of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This wide array of counterinsurgency discourse often echoes or builds upon other historical and contemporary works in some form or fashion. A recent example is the U.S. Army’s release of its Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24.

Field Manual 3-24 discusses the fundamental components for successful counterinsurgency operations, which include: establishing security under the rule of law, separating the insurgent from the population and his cause, effective use of intelligence to drive operations, maintaining a unity of effort, employing the appropriate military strategy and levels of force, managing information and expectations, understanding the enemy, learning and adapting to local conditions, and implementing political solutions upon the conclusion of military operations. In short, it advocates for a population centric method that seeks to persuade the people to join the counterinsurgent by providing a better political alternative than the one offered by the insurgents. Reducing collateral damage and the death of innocent people is also an integral aspect of this theory.\(^6\)

The field manual was derived from a body work produced by various prominent theorists and practitioners. French officer David Galula’s experiences fighting irregular wars in Greece, Indochina, and Algeria is one. Galula highlights the importance of

\(^6\) (2006 December) U.S. Army counterinsurgency field manual 3-24 Headquarters, Department of the Army
employing sufficient force to destroy the insurgent’s military capability and the subsequent political process and reforms that should be undertaken in order to permanently eradicate the movement.7

The manual also draws from the works of counterinsurgents from more than 100 years ago, like late nineteenth century British officer Charles Caldwell, who documented his time fighting in Afghanistan and South Africa. He records how an imperial power can lose against a smaller opponent by: failing to understand the enemy, not providing clear objectives to subordinate commands, and pursuing military objectives that are counterproductive to the achievement of the war’s political goal.8 While much of American doctrine is founded on these individuals’ (and others) invaluable firsthand knowledge, it is predominantly geared for occupancy inspired insurgencies. These principles will apply in a slightly different manner in the Sri Lankan case, which is a domestic insurgency.

This has led me to the work of Strategic Studies Institute research professor, Max Manwaring. Manwaring’s Paradigm is an empirically developed model based on the study of forty-three three post World War II regimes that contended with an externally supported insurgency. The project included interviews with over a hundred individuals who either participated in one the conflicts or were academics that had written extensively on one of the particular wars. The research identified seventy-two variables that were deemed integral to a government’s ability or inability to defeat an

insurgency. Subsequently, these variables were streamlined into a model comprising six dimensions that could be used to measure the effectiveness of any given government’s counterinsurgency effort. These criteria underwent a series of statistical tests (i.e. Probit analyses and standard regression analyses) against other models and were determined to be strong indicators for predicting success or failure.9

These dimensions are: (1) legitimacy; (2) unity of effort; (3) military discipline and capability; (4) type and consistency of external support for the host government; (5) ability to cut external support to the insurgents; and (6) the role of intelligence and information operations. Manwaring explains that “To the extent that these factors are strongly present in any given strategy, they favor success. To the extent that any one component of the model is absent, or only present in a weak form, the probability of success is minimal.”10 He does not guarantee success if all factors are strongly present. Manwaring’s work is directed at better educating U.S. military and civilian leadership for the “asymmetric warfare challenges” of tomorrow; however, he also acknowledges countries around the world engaged in their own internal wars where the U.S. may or may not become involved.11 I selected Manwaring’s Paradigm because it takes the wide variety of variables present in counterinsurgency efforts and outlines them in a simple and “coherent conceptual framework” that can be applied to a nation fighting a

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11 Ibid.
domestic insurgency. Let us review how Manwaring defined each of the six components and how the author will treat them in respect to the Sri Lankan case.

The first, legitimacy, pertains to the host government’s “moral right” to run the country. Thus, the main goal of the regime is to defend, maintain, and improve its right to govern. In this study, Sri Lankan legitimacy is examined along these guidelines and within the context of domestic politics. It will also review the role of external actors (i.e. Norway) in threatening Colombo’s legitimacy. Secondly, unity of effort looks at how a nation’s leadership organizes and enforces a campaign plan that incorporates both civilian and military efforts. This paper investigates this dimension by looking at the interaction between rival Sri Lankan political parties, civil-military relations, and the cohesiveness of the military’s senior leadership in designing and executing a substantive plan to address the Tamil insurgency. Thirdly, military discipline and capability relates to the armed forces’ ability to find, fix, and destroy the insurgent on the battlefield without ostracizing the civilian population. Since abuses towards the Sri Lankan citizenry have been perpetrated by both security forces and the insurgent (which is not uncommon is such wars), this component will strictly examine the military’s battlefield performance against the LTTE (sans any abuses) and the factors that enhanced or detracted from its capability to engage the enemy.

Fourthly, type and consistency of external support for the government investigates the regularity of material and nonmaterial backing provided by foreign

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governments to the host regime. This variable is reviewed accordingly in the thesis. Fifthly, ability to reduce outside aid to the insurgents looks at how effective the government is at removing the rebels from their internal and external sanctuaries and combating their flow of material and political support from abroad. In Sri Lanka’s case, the author predominantly looks at Colombo’s ability to cut LTTE funding and weapons procurement from the Tamil Diaspora and its global infrastructure of legal and illegal businesses. Finally, we examine the role of intelligence. This reviews the government’s effectiveness in gathering and processing intelligence to drive operations, which not only help authorities identify enemy leadership and their supporting infrastructure, but allow the security forces to neutralize them in a timely manner. It also looks at information operations to discredit the insurgent and counter any subversive actions taken to undermine the authority of the ruling government. I will examine Colombo’s use of intelligence and information in the same manner as it pertains to the paradigm.  

It is important to note that the application of Manwaring’s criteria to the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency experience is subject to how I understood them in reference to the case. Although the framework is comprehensive in many aspects, it does not account for specific factors like the impact of terrain or strategic errors made by the insurgent. Due to the fact that these dimensions are interrelated, it is plausible that data pertaining to a specific variable could also be applicable for another. For example, India provided assistance to Sri Lanka in their war against the Tigers by conducting reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean and Palk Straights, providing actionable

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14 Ibid pg 12-14
intelligence for the destruction of LTTE war materials transported by cargo ships. This could fit under the section External Support to the Government of Sri Lanka or the Role of Intelligence and Information Operations. Due to the manner in which I perceived this assistance, I incorporated it under the Role of Intelligence.

This project has assembled and analyzed data on the Sri Lankan conflict from a variety of sources. These include: books, scholarly journal articles, international news agencies, independent research organizations, and structured discussions with military analysts. Since the majority of the war was conducted through telephone and radio communications, there are no references to Sri Lankan internal documents or military operations orders. The various sources used here tend to be published by individuals who have either participated in the war, travelled extensively throughout the region reporting on the insurgency, or have followed the case closely and written on it extensively in the capacity of an analyst or scholar.

The reference material, which provided the foundation for this thesis, underscores similar reasons for Sri Lanka’s current success and past failures. For instance, many analysts recognize the important role 9/11 played in providing the impetus for the international community to help Colombo shut down the Tiger’s support network which helped fund terrorist operations. The administration’s decision to increase the size of the armed forces and enhance their ability to conduct small unit operations is another generally agreed upon factor that was deemed key to the Tiger’s

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15 Structured discussion with South Asian Professor at the Center for Strategic Studies, Colonel Jack Gill September 2010
defeat. Furthermore, interviews with Sri Lankan officials, like Defense Minister Gotobaya Rajapakse and General Sarath Fonseka, offer explicit reasons as to what was done differently to achieve victory. However, some of the information is subject to government bias as the Sri Lankan leadership controlled media coverage regarding the war effort. The data used in this study does not provide perspectives of Tiger commanders. This occurred because much of the Tiger leadership was killed, imprisoned, or went into hiding after the conflict. Data provides a detailed account of the war up until 2009.

The two campaigns I have decided to test Manwaring’s Paradigm against are: Eelam War III (1995-2001) and the CFA/ Eelam War IV (2002-2009). My hypothesis maintains that the Sri Lankan government defeated the Tigers because the components of Manwaring’s Paradigm were strongly present in their counterinsurgency strategy during the latter campaign and present in a weaker form (or absent) during the former. I have chosen these two campaigns for several reasons. One is that the LTTE does not emerge as the sole Tamil military power until after 1990. Prior to the departure of the IPKF, the LTTE was one of many rebel groups engaged in armed rebellion against the government. Secondly, the Sri Lankan Army does not operate at the brigade or division level until the early nineties, which makes assessing the Manwaring Paradigm slightly more difficult and less relevant. Lastly, comparing these two campaigns will allow the reader to better understand the development and progression in government strategy over a consecutive time frame as opposed to a break between the two comparative

\[16 \text{ Ibid}\]
periods (note: data indicates that the strategies pursued by the GOSL during the periods comprising Eelam War II and III were relatively similar, so I selected the third war for greater continuity).

I recognize that using a single case study method limits the applicability of the paradigm (Manwaring’s variables may hold under the Sri Lankan example, but the island nation could be an outlier); however, it will allow the audience to develop a better understanding of the model by looking at a case in greater depth. This is helpful when examining a case that has a great deal of variation within it, like Sri Lanka. Testing the paradigm against two or more nations’ counterinsurgency experiences would limit the ability to execute an in-depth review of the components given the page restrictions of this project.

CHAPTER 3: EELAM WAR III AND THE MANWARING PARADIGM

This chapter measures Manwaring’s Paradigm against the Government of Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency between 1995 and 2001. The data will demonstrate that the framework’s components were either present in a weak form or entirely absent from Colombo’s strategy during this period in history.

LEGITIMACY

Sri Lanka’s government is democratically elected and does not face legitimacy issues in the same manner that an invading power does. For the government seated in Colombo, it is more a function of domestic politics. This manifests itself in two ways.
The first concerns the Tiger’s ability to maintain and operate a de facto government and standing military in the northern and eastern regions of the country. Secondly, it relates to the Sri Lankan government’s ability to properly manage its relationship with the various players involved in the war, like the: political opposition, LTTE, international community, Sri Lankan armed forces, and the population. Furthermore, it accounts for how each of these various groups perceives the government’s respective relationship with the others.

The simple existence of the LTTE threatened the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan government. Retired Indian Colonel R Hariharan explains that the Tigers had established their own administration in the north complete with civil and criminal procedure courts, judiciary, and police force (ironically, which had been done with the help of civil logistical support provided by the government to the northern Tamil community). More importantly, the Tigers fielded both an army and a navy. In 1999, their combined estimated strength was placed at 15,000-18,000 cadres. This number would fluctuate through the years due to combat losses sustained during periods of intense fighting. The LTTE wielded an immense amount of combat power, which included: armor piercing tank weapons and surface to air missiles, mortars, artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems. Jane’s Information Group would later record that: “There is no guerrilla … group in the world with the stand-off capability equal to that of the LTTE…this…has enabled the LTTE to hold ground and fight like a conventional

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force.” However, the government’s inability to secure a monopoly on violence was not the only threat to its legitimacy during this period.

No valid Sri Lankan government could concede to Tamil demands for a separate state—this would give one-third of the land and two-thirds of the coast line to roughly 13 percent of the population! Instead, a devolution package was drafted and first proposed in 1997. The plan posed the idea of transforming the Sri Lankan state into a “union of regions” in which the central government would bestow a significant amount of authority and power to the regional administrations. It would also terminate the current “executive president” form of government and create a second parliament to represent the Tamil population at national level. This contentious solution was exacerbated by the Norwegians who had been invited by Colombo to negotiate the implementation and terms of the package. Asoka Bandarage explains that Norway pressured the GOSL to redeploy its armed forces from the Jaffna Peninsula in LTTE controlled territory and put into effect the devolution package as a precondition for peace talks. On the other hand, the LTTE was not required to make any concessions, like abandoning its calls for independence, forced conscription of child soldiers, or terrorist activities. Norway’s position recognized the Tigers as equals to the Sri Lankan government and gave credence to the guerrillas’ modus operandi.

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President Chandrika Kumaratunga surrendered her quest to gain parliament’s support for the package when her People’s Alliance party faced virulent opposition from rival Sinhala political parties and the Sinhala community at large. In August of 2000, she dissolved parliament in search of a “peoples’ mandate” for the proposed reforms and ended Norway’s effort as mediator when the LTTE stepped up terrorist activities. Maintaining a sense of legitimacy would continue to be a monumental task for any Sinhala party looking to politically resolve the Tamil dilemma. The difficulty in concluding a political solution stemmed from the government's poor unity of effort.

**Unity of Effort**

Between March and July of 2000, President Kumaratunga and UNP head, Ranil Wickremesinghe, met over a dozen times to review the terms of devolution. After intense examination and debate, the two parties came to terms on a package (though it was significantly diluted from its first drafting in 1997). However, the Tamil politicians in the president’s PA coalition government who had originally backed the 1997 accord now rejected the watered down compromise, creating yet another roadblock to settlement. The absence of direct communication between the Tiger leadership and Colombo was another factor contributing to the breakdown. The LTTE rejected devolution because they were not incorporated in its decision making process. One

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sticking point was the Tiger’s demand for the unification of the northern and eastern provinces under a single Tamil authority. Colombo, on the other hand, proposed to keep them as two separate autonomous regions. The inability to negotiate with the Tigers face to face was a consequence of the ruling party’s political restraints, manifested in the form of pressure from the military, Sinhalese Nationalists, and parliamentary coalition partners.²³

Although the UNP recognized devolution as an integral component for peaceful coexistence, they would later stonewall President Kumartunga’s attempt to grant the Tamils autonomy when the bill came to parliament for a vote. UNP apprehensions reflected a fear that the rival PA party would reap all the political capital from such an accord while they would suffer from political backlash for failing to provide a “counterweight to PA designs.” Moreover, the platforms touted by these two Sinhala parties were growing increasingly similar, like promoting the liberalization of Sri Lanka’s market economy. As a result, the approach to resolving the ethnic conflict was the only element separating the two groups.²⁴

Devolution was the peace portion in the government’s slogan “war for peace,” in which a political solution would be implemented after a military defeat of the Tigers. But the failure of senior military officials to implement an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy that would decisively destroy LTTE military prowess prevented the “war for peace” plan from fully maturing. In one camp sat officials who

believed a direct conventional attack on Jaffna, the center of gravity for the LTTE counter state, was the most effective way to cull the insurgency. The primary champion of this approach was presidential relative and Defense Minister, Anuraddha Ratwatte. He was supported by a likeminded group of respected senior military advisors.\textsuperscript{25}

In the other camp sat another group of renowned senior military officers, both active and retired. They advocated for a slower, more methodical plan. They believed dominating small areas by force and then reconstituting government control in the aftermath of military operations was the best blueprint for success. This plan was not only more cost effective for the government but it was less deadly for soldiers to execute. Special Forces and mobile strike units would be the primary groups responsible for carrying out this strategy, which had tremendous success against the second JVP (People’s Liberation Front) communist insurgency in 1994.\textsuperscript{26} However, the proponents of this argument were brushed aside. As a result, the military adopted a conventional course of action for an unconventional problem.

\textit{Military Discipline & Capability}

The Sri Lankan Armed Forces achieved initial success in the winter of 1995 when they secured the Jaffna Peninsula after two months of intensive fighting. One senior officer at Colombo’s operational command center explained the reasoning behind

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid pg 511
the assault: “The politicians wanted to cut off the head. They wanted, above all, to be able to say that they had taken the heartland of the LTTE.” This accomplishment would come at a heavy price as the government quickly found themselves in a “classic case of strategic overreach.”

The size of the army at this time roughly consisted of 90,000-95,000 soldiers, of which 40,000 were activated reservists. This was about 15,000 men short of the army’s authorized level of 105,000. As a result, they were unable to simultaneously hold ground and carry out large assaults against the LTTE. The military high command had abandoned 20 military bases in Sri Lanka’s eastern province just to secure the city of Jaffna. Consequently, the LTTE moved in behind the military strengthening their foothold in the east.

In the spring of 1996 the LTTE launched major counterattacks in response to the government’s Jaffna victory. In March, the Tiger’s destroyed the Sri Lankan military component at Sittandy, killing over 70 soldiers. In July, the Tiger’s overran the Sri Lankan military base in Mullativu, killing over 1,200 soldiers and absconding with over $70 million in military hardware. This debacle, coined operation Ceaseless Waves by the LTTE, became the military’s single biggest defeat to that point in the war.

In investigations of the aftermath, bases often displayed signs of being sparsely defended, with observation posts and defensive positions being abandoned. One base

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29 Harris, P. (1996)
commander explained that such losses contributed to the growing rate of desertion, noting that when his men went home for two weeks of leave, roughly 30 percent did not return. Furthermore, army personnel would only conduct limited day time patrols and remain within the confines of their barracks at night, giving greater freedom of maneuver to LTTE cadres. In late 1998, the Tiger’s initiated the second stage of operation Ceaseless Waves to counter Sri Lankan soldiers moving towards the city of Killinocchi—who were attempting to secure an overland link to their comrades in Jaffna. Again more than a thousand government soldiers were killed or missing in action.

For almost a year following the winter of 1998, the LTTE did not undertake any military offensives. The Sri Lankan military believed this was due to the heavy casualties the guerrillas had incurred during previous clashes. They failed to recognize that the lull was the result of the rebels recruiting and training more fighters and improving their ability to employ indirect fire assets. When they emerged again in late 1999, they had developed the capability to mount large conventional attacks. This was glaringly evident when the Tiger’s seized over 1,000 square kilometers of territory from the Sri Lankan military in December of 1999 and overwhelmed the military base at Elephant’s Pass in April of 2000. These debacles prompted the government to redeploy 10,000 troops from the north to the south, effectively stranding the 30,000 troops in Jaffna.

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The Sri Lankan Air Force and Navy would also prove ineffective. The air force was primarily used for transporting troops around the battlefield, instead of providing close air support to troops in contact. They also refrained from flying at night for fear of being shot down by LTTE surface to air missiles or anti-aircraft guns. The Navy had traditionally been a ceremonial force and was not accustomed to fighting an asymmetric war on the open seas. As a result, even with high tech “fast attack crafts” (FAC) from Israel, the Sri Lankan Navy could not counter the swarming tactics employed by the Sea Tigers.

**TYPE & CONSISTENCY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA**

Although Sri Lanka benefitted from the receipt of military equipment and training, most of the global community remained focused on facilitating a peaceful solution through political arrangement to end the war. Donna Hicks and Bill Weisberg of Harvard University’s Program for International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) provide an example of such backing. PICAR, with funding from the U.S. Peace Institute, brought together key players from the LTTE and Sri Lankan government using an “interactive problem-solving approach” in hopes of paving the road to more effective (official) peace talks. Although this endeavor was not divisive like the Norwegians, Hicks and Weisberg quickly realized the futility of their efforts, stating: “strategic differences seem irreconcilable, and in the absence of interaction

34 Fish, T. (2009). Sri lanka learns to counter set tiger’s swarm tactics. Jane’s Navy International
between the two parties, any attempt to reconcile these differences backfires.”

At the same time, the Tigers were becoming increasingly more powerful and experiencing greater success on the battlefield, thus there was little incentive for Prabhakaran to settle for anything less than independence.

The United States also provided military support to Colombo by way of training for its armed forces. U.S. Special Operations Command sent Army Green Berets and Navy SEALs to train the Sri Lankan military in the areas of: intelligence collection, “explosive handling, casualty evacuation, aircraft safety and maintenance, and law of armed conflict.” Pakistan would also extend support to Colombo. Sri Lankan officers were not only granted more slots to attend Pakistani military colleges, but Pakistani officers were sent to Sri Lankan defense schools to help improve the curriculum. Islamabad also loaned military hardware to cover any shortfalls experienced by the Sri Lankan government. In November of 1999, Li Ruihuan, the third most powerful man in China’s political hierarchy, travelled to Sri Lanka with a delegation of military officers. During a speech to Colombo’s leadership, he pledged continued military support, like the continued sale of artillery pieces, to the island nation.

Britain established staff colleges for Sri Lankan officers, while Israel sold high tech fast attack craft to the Sri Lankan navy and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to

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the army. \textsuperscript{37} India gave political backing to Colombo, but otherwise refrained from providing direct support. Even though New Delhi had cut ties with the LTTE shortly after the rebels assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in 1990, it still had to remain politically mindful of their Tamil constituents in the country’s southern state of Tamil Nadu. By default, absence of Indian support for the Tigers translated to support for the Sri Lankan government. However, domestic politics and poor management of the war effort would prevent Colombo from capitalizing on any external aid in the short term.

\textit{Cutting International Support to the LTTE}

The government’s failure to implement an appropriate and decisive strategy to combat the LTTE was only one reason for the organization’s longevity. Colombo’s inability to dismantle the Tiger’s global support network played a major role, too. The International Institute for Counter Terrorism highlights that this global network spanned across 50 nations, including countries in: Africa, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. \textsuperscript{38} The LTTE’s primary sources of income came from the Tamil Diaspora, either through voluntary donations or forced taxation. But they also financed operations through other measures, both legal and illicit, including: the gem trade; drug trafficking; investments in stocks, money markets, and real estate; and the operation of farms, finance corporations, and restaurants located around the world. They even served as a


\textsuperscript{38} Ajit Kumar Singh (2008 April 28), Targeting ltte’s global network, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, www.ict.org
bank, lending money to Tamil start-up businesses for a cut of their future revenue stream.\(^{39}\)

This massive financial apparatus generated over $80 million per year.\(^{40}\) With only an $8 million operating cost for its parallel government in Sri Lanka the Tiger’s were able to spend handsomely on military hardware and propaganda.\(^{41}\) Monthly revenues from Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom amounted to (US) $650,000, (C) $1,000,000, and (US) 385,000 respectively!\(^{42}\) However, there were some efforts that were undertaken to start targeting this golden goose.

In 1996, Malaysia made it a criminal offense to provide any form of backing to the LTTE, which included the deportation of any foreigner supporting pro-Tiger functions. In late 1997, the United States proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Thailand would follow suit in 2000 when Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, Banyat Bautadtan, stated that the Thai government would no longer allow the LTTE to operate from its southern provinces. In 2001, the United Kingdom banned the Tigers as a terrorist organization and froze their assets located in the country.\(^{43}\) Even though these measures were steps in the right direction and made fundraising more difficult for the LTTE, they would not take effect or be aggressively


\(^{41}\) Solomon/Tan, J/B.C. (2007). Feeding the tiger: how sri lankan insurgents fund the war. *Jane’s Intelligence Review*

\(^{42}\) Fair, C. (2004)

pursued until after 9/11. For example, the Tiger’s continued to fundraise in countries that had ban them vis-à-vis charity associations like: the United Tamil Organization, the World Tamil Movement, and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization. Ultimately, the failure to shut down this global economic empire rested with Colombo, which was more focused on finding a way to peacefully coexist with the LTTE than defeating them.

**ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

After the army’s capture of the Jaffna Peninsula in 1995, the LTTE moved the war southward towards Colombo through a string of terrorist attacks. For example, in January of 1996, the Tiger’s exploded a truck bomb in front of the Sri Lankan Central Bank in Colombo killing over a hundred people and wounding more than 1,400. Later that same year, the LTTE blew up a commuter train killing 78 passengers and conducted a suicide assault on the capital city’s port. The success of these attacks reflected the Sri Lankan security forces’ incompetence in collecting and processing intelligence.

The poor organization for the unity of effort within the Sri Lankan police intelligence division was a major reason for shortfalls in this area. The Office of the Police Inspector General was divided into three separate commands, each responsible for gathering information and intelligence at the local level in their individual battle

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45 Alexander, Y (2006) pg 163
46 Each command was responsible for either the northern, central, or southern part of the island.
space. These three headquarters only collaborated together in a loose respect and lacked an integrated system to plan coordinated operations. As a result, intelligence was stove piped in each center’s respective bureaucracy. Information collected by state and military intelligence agencies rarely found its way down to the police patrolling the streets, as well.\footnote{Fair, C. (2004). Urban battle fields of south asia: lessons learned from sri lanka, india, and pakistan. Washington, DC: RAND Corporation. Pg 52}

Sri Lanka’s Directorate of Internal Intelligence and the police’s Special Branch, two groups tasked with planning and executing intelligence activities, also had severe manpower and resource shortages. This made it increasingly more difficult for officials to effectively carry out their duties in an efficacious manner. Lastly, Sri Lankans lost confidence in the security forces’ ability to protect them from LTTE cadres living in their communities. Consequently, they were less willingly to offer information to the police regarding potential rebel and terrorist activities.

These gaps became dramatically apparent in the Tiger’s 2001 suicide attack on Bandaranaike International Airport. Security officials had failed to discern the true identity of an LTTE surveillance team posing as Sinhala street vendors across from the airport. Despite investigating the undercover agents, officers were convinced by the group’s seemingly innocuous behavior—which included clapping to Sinhala music. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna explains that the attack “revealed the weakness of strategic and tactical intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination and review and second, force protection…there was no prioritization of intelligence gathering, projection and sharing
to erode the LTTE network.” A poorly integrated system and incompetence permitted the rebels to establish an extensive intelligence apparatus in Colombo over the course of a year. Surprisingly enough, there were no real changes to the security environment after the attack. Dr. Christine Fair explains this odd behavior stating that the Sri Lankan idea of security is associated more with increasing the number of armed guards rather than improving actual security procedures or mechanisms.

Colombo’s efforts to counter LTTE propaganda were also largely ineffective. The Tiger’s had a semi-official diplomatic infrastructure comprising 38 offices around the world, in nations as disparate as Japan and South Africa. These stations not only mobilized the Tamil Diaspora but the sympathy of the global community. The rebels utilized technology such as the internet, satellite telephones, and fax machines to distribute daily updates regarding the Tamil independence struggle to these various stations. These LTTE diplomatic outposts would then provide the reports to any interested host nation news agency or official diplomatic mission for publication. This allowed Prabhakaran to successfully take advantage of the negative image the western world maintained towards the Sri Lankan government and its dubious human rights record. On the other hand, Colombo continued to struggle in a sump of censorship and

48 Gunaratna, R. (September 01, 2001). Intelligence failures exposed by tamil tiger airport attack. Jane's Intelligence Review
red tape that rarely allowed for its successes to be broadcasted internally, let alone the outside world.\(^{50}\)

The variables comprising Manwaring’s Paradigm were either absent or weakly present during Eelam War III. Even with support from external countries, the political leadership’s inability to take decisive action and come to a consensus on a unified strategy to the Tamil dilemma would ensure the longevity of the LTTE. The counterinsurgency approach undertaken between 1995 and 2001 upholds the hypothesis that if any of the six components are present in a weak form or not at all, even if some are strongly represented, the chances for success are marginal.

**Chapter 4: Cease Fire Agreement—Eelam War IV and the Manwaring Paradigm**

In accordance with the preceding chapter, this section analyzes the Sri Lankan strategy against Manwaring’s criteria from the beginning of the CFA in 2002, to the end of Eelam War IV in 2009. Data pertaining to the first several years of this period reveals that Colombo suffered from similar issues previously experienced in the last years of the 20\(^{th}\) century; however, during the course of Eelam War IV (2006-2009) we will see that the paradigm’s components are strongly represented in the government’s strategy.

Rising costs in blood, a struggling Sri Lankan economy, and ineffective military campaigns provided the impetus for the newly elected UNP led parliament to sign a Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE in February of 2002. Again, Norway would act as the arbiter for peace talks due to its experience and perceived trustworthiness by the LTTE. Minus the concession of a separate state for the Tamil people, the government held true to its declaration of “peace at any cost.” Prime Minister Wickremasinghe, leader of the UNP parliament, confirmed this position stating: I’m not saying ‘no’ to anything, except a separate state.”

But desperate for peace, even the “no separate state” rule would be bent as the CFA became heavily weighted in favor of the Tigers.

The agreement did not require LTTE cadres to lay down weapons, but instead required rival Tamil paramilitary organizations to disarm. These groups would be disbanded, incorporated into the national military, and deployed in areas outside LTTE control for service. This measure elevated the Tiger’s position while weakening the Sri Lankan military instrument of national power in the process. The most astonishing CFA article was Clause 1.6 which stated that areas under the control of the government and LTTE “shall continue to apply pending…demarcation.”

In other words, the government was not only offering a greater degree of political autonomy but was

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agreeing to a “formal partition” of Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran, in essence, had achieved an independent Tamil homeland. London based journalist, Paul Harris, would describe the government’s concessions as the “greatest giveaway in history.” The terms of the CFA, backed by the Norwegians, gave an international terrorist organization equal status to a democratically elected government, seriously threatening Colombo’s legitimacy. Moreover, such concessions could encourage other Sri Lankan minorities (i.e. Muslims) to challenge the government for greater autonomy.

Yet Prabhakaran remained intransigent in his demand for an independent state with complete and not partial autonomy from the central government. As a result, the LTTE walked away from the talks. However, a series of fortuitous events would help the government regain the sense of legitimacy it had wrestled to maintain throughout the years. In 2004, disillusioned eastern LTTE commander, Colonel Karuna, split ways with Prabhakaran and took his fighters with him—roughly 60 percent of LTTE combat strength. The eastern Tigers not only produced more soldiers for combat, but their disproportionate cost in life and blood did not earn them any proportionate “power and authority within the LTTE hierarchy.” Karuna also highlighted Prabhakaran’s unequal distribution of resources as a point of contention, as the northern faction was more sufficiently supplied. Karuna’s defection to the government’s side severely damaged Prabhakaran’s image as the sole representative of the Tamil people.

53 Ibid
55 Ibid
Lastly, were two strategic missteps made by the LTTE. The first, in August of 2005, was the assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, for his active role in persuading the international community to ban the Tigers as a terrorist group. The second blunder, in February 2006, was the assault on the Trincomalee harbor in the eastern part of the island that prevented water from reaching Sinhala and Muslim farmlands in Mavil Aru. These attacks not only convinced Colombo and the global community that the LTTE were not committed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, but pushed war weary Sri Lankans into the government camp. This afforded President Mahinda Rajapakse greater legitimacy to abrogate talks and launch an all out war against the Tigers. The CFA would nominally remain in effect until its dissolving in early 2008.

**UNITY OF EFFORT**

The CFA continued to underscore Sri Lanka’s failure in organizing any unity of effort for resolving the conflict. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s appetent concessions signaled to the Tigers that Colombo was bargaining from a weakened position, which was ultimately counterproductive. Furthermore, Wickremesinghe failed to keep President Kumaratunga abreast of his dealings with the LTTE. This spread fear throughout the country that the prime minister was “selling the country out” to terrorists. Vernon Mendis explains that the lack of transparency, the government’s

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imprecise stance during talks, and the prime minister’s belief that the international community would keep the LTTE at the negotiating table, were major reasons for the breakdown of the peace talks.\textsuperscript{58}

Parliament’s conduct of its daily affairs was also demonstrative of the political deterioration befalling Colombo, where members often resorted to physical brawls and vulgar accusations during debates and functions.\textsuperscript{59} During a television address in 2002, President Chandrika Kumaratunga reprimanded her opposition (UNP) for what she perceived were their attempts to strip her of her executive powers, stating: “If they come to kill me I will kill 500 before dying. This Chandrika will not die like a kitten.”\textsuperscript{60}

Infighting and lack of leadership and direction would change when Mahinda Rajapakse assumed the presidency in November, 2005.

Although President Rajapakse was initially committed to finding a political solution to the war, he was far more hard lined than his predecessors. So when the LTTE continued their terrorist activities, the president did not hesitate to abrogate the CFA and launch a military campaign against them. Retired Colonel R Hariharan explains that Rajapakse brought “clarity of objective” in dealing with the Tigers. The president “provided support to combine policy making, planning and executing actions” not only in the military and ministry of defense, but the entire government bureaucracy

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as well. The president facilitated this process in two ways. The first was through the forging of strong political alliances. Mahinda Rajapakse aligned his Sri Lankan Freedom Party with two political organizations that were steadfastly anti-LTTE, the People’s Liberation Front and the National Heritage Party. He also won backing from Muslim members of parliament. Furthermore, the president cultivated an amicable partnership with Colonel Karuna and his followers, who defected from the LTTE and subsequently formed a political party called Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers (TMVP). Karuna would eventually be appointed as the chief minister of the newly established Eastern Provincial Council, governing the same area for Colombo that he had once managed for the LTTE.

The second method was through the appointment of his brother, Gotobaya Rajapakse, to the position of Defense Minister and General Sarath Fonseka, to Commander of the Army. Gotobaya and Fonseka both had extensive battlefield experience against the LTTE and understood what measures had to be implemented to decisively end the insurgency (surviving an LTTE assassination attempt would also harden Fonseka’s resolve in defeating the rebels). Gotobaya gave a free hand to the service chiefs to revamp their force structures as necessary in order to make them more effective and efficient in executing their respective duties. He mitigated disputes that arose between branch chiefs and was an effective interface between the civilian and

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military hierarchy which prevented breakdowns in communication and operations.\textsuperscript{63} The Rajapakse brothers kept politics from interfering in the war effort and authorized experienced senior officers to run daily operations as they saw fit.

The Defense Minister highlights his brother’s ability to make decisive choices as another critical reason for government cohesiveness, noting that: “All the four previous presidents could not take bold decisions. They were indecisive and afraid that bold decisions might negatively impact our small economy…..and the polity.”\textsuperscript{64} In 2009, Colombo’s strengthened unity would face its moment of truth when the international community and the LTTE called for a new ceasefire agreement. President Rajapakse knew that the Prabhakaran would only use a ceasefire and peace talks as a decoy to reorganize and built up his military capacity—as he had done previously. The president also understood that executing a war while simultaneously negotiating a political settlement would not bring about a decisive end to the conflict. The government’s new political will shielded the military from pressure to curb operations and permitted it to accomplish its mission unimpeded. Subsequently, this marked change in unity of effort would enhance the discipline and capabilities of the military.

\textit{Military Discipline & Capability}

The growth of the defense budget played an integral role in paving the military’s road to victory over the LTTE. In 2007, the small island nation spent 139 billion Sri

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Lankan rupees on defense (just over USD $1bn). In 2008, that figure rose to 166bn rupees (USD$1.48bn) and in 2009, 177bn rupees (USD $1.6bn). This roughly equates to a 20 percent and 6.4 percent increase respectively.\footnote{Lunn, J. Taylor, C. Townsend, I. (2009, June 5) Research paper 09/51. War and peace in sri lanka. House of Commons Library. And (2007, October 10) Sri lanka defence budget to soar. http://news.bbc.co.uk} This aided the efforts of Gotobaya Rajapakse and General Fonseka in transforming and enhancing the capabilities of the Sri Lankan Army. These funds made it possible to fill personnel equipment shortages as most soldiers possessed one uniform and a single pair of boots and roughly 40,000 went without helmets and flak vests.\footnote{Seneviratne, M. (2008, December). \textit{Lieutenant general sarath fonseka: the man of the moment.} Retrieved from http://businesstoday.intoday.in/} The new budget also financed the standing up of five new divisions for the final confrontation against the Tigers.

In an interview with Malinda Seneviratne, General Fonseka remarked: “the people realized that something concrete was happening, that this time around there was commitment, capability, and determination on the part of the political leadership as well as the security forces.”\footnote{Ibid} As a result, subsequent recruitment drives became highly successful. The general would also highlight the army’s August 2006 victory in Mavil Aru (where the LTTE blocked water access to Sinhala and Muslim farmers) as a positive momentum swing that attracted new recruits. Jane’s Intelligence Review explains that this initial success led 7,457 soldiers to join the military in 2006.
Continued progress would encourage 36,000 to join in 2007 and 33,000 in 2008.\textsuperscript{68} This was a drastic improvement from earlier years, where the army attracted roughly 3,000 new soldiers per year.\textsuperscript{69}

Defense Minister Gotobaya also expanded the police’s paramilitary arm, the Special Task Force, and established an armed, 42,000 man, “civil defense force.” These forces secured areas and towns after military operations were complete and prevented the reemergence of LTTE fighters. This permitted the military to pursue the Tigers and launch attacks on multiple fronts, stretching Prabhakaran’s forces thin.\textsuperscript{70} This expansion also allowed the armed forces to absorb extensive combat losses while simultaneously conducting offensive operations. The timing and tempo of military operations placed the LTTE on the defensive, making it far more difficult for the rebels to launch offensive operations. Rohan Gunaratna underscores the rebels’ strategic error in adopting conventional tactics in response to the army’s advances as another reason for their defeat (evident in several kilometer long trench lines built by the Tigers). They simply did not have the manpower to fight a conventional battle with the national army, especially after Colonel Karuna and his fighters defected from the organization.\textsuperscript{71}

Training also enhanced the armed forces ability to conduct the war effort more effectively. The Special Infantry Operations Team (SIOT) program, which started in

2002, was given greater emphasis in order to increase the unconventional warfare capability of the military. This five month course provided instruction to students in jungle warfare, explosives handling, combat lifesaver techniques, and signals communication for directing close air support and artillery strikes. These specially trained units would also augment regular infantry formations to “uplift standards” and share their newly acquired knowledge. For example, Brigadier General Shavendra Silva notes that the LTTE “did not expect me to capture the strategically important town of Paranthan…by outflanking them.” Retired Sri Lankan Lt. Colonel Anil Amarasekera also records how small unit tactics training increased the ability of the Sri Lankan Army to operate at night, limiting the Tigers’ freedom of maneuver on the battlefield.

The last major component enhancing to the army’s capability was the manner in which the progression and placement of officers were handled. Prior to General Fonseka’s tenure as Army Commander, officers in the military were promoted and awarded command positions based on time in service and grade. This did not always produce the most competent officer for the job. Under Fonseka’s direction, officers would only be promoted based on performance and experience. Although this created friction early on, the general explains that hues and cries disappeared when positive

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gains were made on the battlefield. It also encouraged the officer corps to perform at their highest level.\textsuperscript{75}

The revamped Sri Lankan Navy and Air Force would also play a decisive role in the destruction of the LTTE. During Eelam War III, the Sri Lankan Navy struggled to counter the LTTE’s naval tactics, even with superior technology from Israel. At the end of the CFA, the Tigers had developed even more effective and efficient attack craft. Navy Chief, Vice Admiral Karannagoda, explains that in order to combat this new threat, naval engineers embarked on a comprehensive research and development initiative. This effort produced the Small Boats Concept, which essentially adopted the Tiger’s unconventional sea tactics but on a far larger scale. Based in Colombo, the Sri Lankan Navy would manufacture hundreds of attack boats in three different classes, with each class suited to execute missions in varying levels of ocean waters. Admiral Karannagoda would note this as “a major turning point in the progress of the war.”\textsuperscript{76}

This new capability not only effectively countered the Sea Tigers in open water warfare, but it also aided in the destruction of cargo ships that transported military hardware and logistical goods to the LTTE in Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{77}

Last, but not least, we review the significant role played by the Air Force against the guerrillas. During this campaign, the Air Force was not used primarily as a transport service. They provided close air support to troops engaged in firefights, destroyed


\textsuperscript{76} Information in paragraph extracted from-Fish, T. (2009). Sri lanka learns to counter set tiger's swarm tactics. Jane’s Navy International

LTTE infrastructure, conducted forward bombing runs to facilitate the advancement of ground troops, and evacuated casualties in a timely manner. The air force no longer reflected the timidity it had displayed in previous campaigns, flying over 13,000 combat missions in Eelam War IV. Sampath Thuycontha, commander of the No. 9 squadron, explained that there were multiple instances in which “damaged choppers had to come down in areas where fighting was raging.” But thanks to rapid responses by repair teams, damaged aircraft would return to the front lines in a timely manner. Improving service branch capabilities boosted soldier morale, damaged the perception of the rebel’s invincibility, and ultimately brought an end to the insurgency. Although skilled training and clear objectives helped the Sri Lankan soldiers achieve stunning victories, they could not have accomplished their mission without the assistance of several foreign partners.

TYPE AND CONSISTENCY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA

Despite the fact that Colombo received support from numerous countries like Israel, Russia, and America, it’s most important backing came from regional neighbors India, Pakistan, and China. As noted in the previous chapter, India was cautious not to get directly involved in Sri Lanka’s affairs as it had to contend with potential political backlash from its own domestic Tamil population. Nevertheless, they understood the

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threat posed by the LTTE. As a result, India’s support came in the form of intelligence sharing (discussed in the last section of this chapter) and a guarantee to Colombo that New Delhi would not interfere in the war against the Tigers, as they had done in 1987. This indirect approach not only removed a possible barrier for Colombo and a new source of life for the Tigers but it created a prime opportunity for regional competitors, Pakistan and China, to establish a stronger presence in India’s backyard.

Military ties between Pakistan and Sri Lanka had been favorable in previous years but had been limited in nature since 2000. However, this would change during the summer of 2008 when Sri Lankan Army Chief General Fonseka travelled to Islamabad to see his “Pakistani counterpart” General Parvez Kayani. The two generals would finalize deals that would provide almost $200 million in advanced military equipment and weaponry to the Sri Lankan Army. These deals included everything from tanks to mortars. Strengthening relationships further, Pakistani and Sri Lankan defense ministers also agreed to facilitate joint training exercises and intelligence sharing programs between their armed forces in order to combat terrorism. Islamabad not only continued sending advisors to guide Sri Lankan military efforts, but in August of 2008 Pakistani air force pilots even participated in bombing raids against LTTE hideouts. 79

Although China did not send military advisors or authorize air strikes, they transferred large amount of arms, ammunition, and money to Colombo. They also provided “robust” support at the United Nations, particularly at a time when Sri Lankan

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armed forces were being criticized for human rights abuses. Yet Chinese backing was not a reflection of its altruistic nature. At the same time they began shipping arms to Colombo they began constructing a deep water port on Sri Lanka’s southern coastline. China was not only looking to protect its Middle East oil shipments which pass through the Indian Ocean, but they were hoping to increase their presence within the region. Its help merely revealed its interest in energy security and expanding its sphere of influence. Regardless, this quid pro quo relationship benefited the Sri Lankan government.

Pakistani and Chinese aid not only made up for declining American arms sales and military training in light of Colombo’s suspected human rights abuse, but it enhanced the combat power that the newly restructured Sri Lankan armed forces could project into LTTE controlled territories. The Sri Lankan government’s cohesiveness and clear strategy would finally permit it to capitalize on this external support. Other foreign entities would come to Sri Lanka’s aid by shutting down the Tiger’s global financial and arms procurement apparatus.

**Cutting International Support to the LTTE**

The events that transpired on 9/11 did much in changing the world’s perception towards groups employing terrorism as a tactic to achieve political objectives. Although

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80 Page, J. (2009 May 16) China support crucial to sri lankan victory over tamils, The Times, [www.timesonline.co.uk](http://www.timesonline.co.uk)
81 (2009 May 23) Sri lanka’s new chapter, BBC News, [www.news.bbc.co.uk](http://www.news.bbc.co.uk)
LTTE terrorist attacks remained relatively low in the first five years of the 21st century because of the CFA, a devastating tsunami, and the heightened sensitivity towards terrorism after 9/11, the insurgents would again demonstrate that a Tiger never loses its stripes. The 2005 assassination of Sri Lanka’s foreign minister, 2006 suicide bombing of Sri Lanka’s army headquarters, and 2006 attack on Trincomalee Harbor not only convinced the hard line Rajapakse regime but the international community that the LTTE were not committed to peace talks under the CFA. Consequently, the European Union and Canada joined the list of foreign bodies banning the LTTE in 2006 as the global community acted in concert, aggressively pursuing the Tiger’s worldwide support network.

The EU’s ban froze LTTE assets in 25 countries across Europe and effectively tightened the noose around the group’s efforts to collect funds for its operations. It would also shut down the rebel’s extensive office in Paris, which played an integral part in the Tiger’s propaganda war. In April of 2006 Canadians raided offices of a Tamil front organization “seizing computers, files, and political documents.” In August that same year, 13 individuals with close ties to the LTTE were arrested across the United States after an FBI investigation noted the suspects’ intentions to purchase missiles and transport terrorist funds. In March of 2007, Indonesian arms dealer Haji Subandi was arrested in Guam for attempting to sell sophisticated weaponry, including surface to air missiles, to the LTTE.

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83 Ajit Kumar Singh (2008 April 28) Targeting ltte’s global network, International Institute for Counter-
In November of 2007 the U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of the LTTE front group, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization—the same entity that had lobbied U.S. congressmen in an attempt to get the Tigers removed from Washington’s list of terrorist groups. The U.S. would also assist Sri Lanka through other measures beyond the capture of LTTE financiers. American authorities also trained Sri Lankan personnel in agencies related to counter-terrorism. The Council on Foreign Relations underscores that the Department of State worked with Sri Lanka to establish the Container Security Initiative and the Mega-ports program at the port of Colombo. These measures aimed to address “the threat to border security and global trade posed by the potential for terrorist use of maritime container to deliver a weapon.” By using advanced detection technology to investigate each container and computer tracking systems to identify high risk containers, US Customs and Border Protection agents and Sri Lankan authorities worked together in order to stop numerous weapons shipments from getting through to the LTTE.

In June of 2008, over 200 Italian police officers participated in raids that led to the capture of 33 LTTE operatives located in 10 different cities across Italy, including Sicily. Investigations revealed that the suspects had been extracting taxes from the Italy’s Tamil expatriates in order to fund the group’s activities in Sri Lanka. Naples

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Terrorism, http://www.ict.org


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police spokesman, Luigi Bonacura, stated that the operations had effectively destroyed the Tiger infrastructure in Italy.\textsuperscript{87}

It is also important to highlight that many members of the Tamil Diaspora voluntarily curbed their financial endowments to the LTTE. They identified “increased surveillance and the willingness to prosecute” by host governments as major reasons for their actions\textsuperscript{88}. Tamil expatriates simply had too much to lose in the post 9/11 world. There were attempts by the LTTE to restore their primary source of financing in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami disaster. Most of the monies that were sent to Sri Lanka to facilitate the relief process were funneled through Colombo, mainly to ensure that the LTTE could not misuse the funds for military procurements. The Tigers solicited the international community for direct aid in order to help them provide services to Tamils in the north, explaining that Colombo was focusing its efforts on non-Tamil areas. Yet this proved nearly impossible given its proscription as a terrorist group and the banning of its traditional front groups, like the TRO. In some cases, the rebels managed to circumvent these bans by creating unregistered charity organizations, like “White Pigeon” in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{89} However, these efforts would prove futile in the end as the global community slowly and methodically smothered the Tiger’s golden goose to death.

\textsuperscript{87} (2008 June 19) Italian police on the lookout for hardcore ltte cadres, The Asian Tribune, \url{http://asiantribune.com}
ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Last but certainly not least, we examine Sri Lanka’s effective use of intelligence and information in the insurgency’s defeat. One key factor improving the government’s collection capability stemmed from its newly restructured and highly trained military. Special operations units, which consisted of four to eight men, were frequently deployed into LTTE controlled sectors, providing real time battlefield intelligence. Jane’s columnist, Sergei DeSilva, explains that these outfits had multiple functions, including: acting as forward observers for artillery strikes and close air support; jamming communications; and executing ambushes against “listening posts, mortar positions, and (LTTE) reconnaissance teams, convoys, and field commanders.”

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) served as a “force multiplier” that augmented Sri Lankan ground forces, as well. They located LTTE infrastructure, formations, defense lines, and indirect fire assets. They were also used to conduct damage assessments after a battle and to facilitate airstrikes.

Eelam War IV provided Sri Lanka’s Navy with a prime opportunity to apply the training they had received from foreign advisors, like the U.S. Navy SEALs. Their vital role manifested itself in several ways. For example, they facilitated long range communications between headquarters and field units and conducted surveillance on the activities of the LTTE’s naval wing, the Sea Tigers. They even executed land based

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raids and reconnaissance missions against the rebels.\textsuperscript{92} India would also assist in the Sri Lankan effort to shut down the Tiger’s naval contingency by flying reconnaissance missions from bases located in Tamil Nadu. Indian Dorniers equipped with advanced radars conducted patrols across the Indian Ocean and Palk Straights in search of LTTE ships transporting war material to the Tigers in Sri Lanka. When a suspect ship was identified, the information was passed to the Sri Lankan Navy allowing it to action the Sea Tigers in a timely fashion.\textsuperscript{93} This contributed to the destruction of several floating warehouses used to transport supplies to the separatists.\textsuperscript{94}

Despite human rights abuse accusations, the Karuna Group was a major component in the intelligence war. Although they had organized a political party (the TMVP) aspects of the group functioned as a paramilitary force. Karuna managed a network of informants that identified LTTE operatives and sympathizers in the eastern province and produced information that guided military operations against the insurgents. The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EFDP), another pro government Tamil political party toting a paramilitary arm, would provide similar assistance. The EFDP supervised an informant network in the north that would also locate LTTE operatives and supporters.\textsuperscript{95} This not only aided in the systematic dismantling of the Tiger’s internal support network but made it increasingly difficult for them to operate

\textsuperscript{92} Fish, T. (2009). Sri Lanka learns to counter set tiger's swarm tactics. \textit{Jane's Navy International}
and recruit new fighters as they had to protect against possible infiltration by government backed forces.

Colombo also employed radar systems to detect LTTE fighter pilots seeking to attack military bases and other government infrastructure. For example, one Tiger attack was thwarted when two of their fighter jets were picked up on a military base’s radar system in Vavuniya. Within eight minutes of detection, Colombo had dispatched its own Chinese made F-7 interceptor jets. The Sri Lankan Air Force not only successfully shot down one of the Tiger pilots but it flew multiple sorties over LTTE runways in Iranamadu and Puthukurirripu, rendering them non-mission capable for mounting air operations. The death of one of the pilots was confirmed when Sri Lankan forces intercepted LTTE radio transmissions requesting Tiger cadres to locate the debris of their missing fighter plane. 96

There were even incidents where the Tamil community voluntarily offered intelligence on LTTE cadres. General Fonseka explains that many civilians in the north had lost “faith and confidence” in the LTTE and began to provide government forces with information on the group’s activities and members. 97 In February of 2009, Tamil expatriates living in Cyprus gave information to Cypriot authorities that led to the capture of prominent LTTE leader, Herath Mudiyanselage Rohan Priyantha. 98 The

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Tiger’s loss in credibility not only stemmed from their systematic defeat on the battlefield but from the effective information war waged by Colombo.

Colonel Hariharan explains that President Rajapakse tied his campaign against the LTTE into the greater Global War on Terror. Launching a highly visible propaganda effort portraying the Tigers as a terrorist organization and not as an independence movement helped garner international support for Colombo’s cause while simultaneously stripping legitimacy from the LTTE (of course, Prabhakaran played into the government’s hand with continued attacks and political assassinations). For example, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama travelled around the world encouraging foreign leaders to ban the LTTE while underscoring that Sri Lanka’s military campaign targeted terrorism (i.e. LTTE), not the Tamil people. Defense Minister Rajapakse also highlights their portrayal of information to Indian leadership as a major reason for their success. While some countries could slap sanctions on the island nation and criticize Colombo’s aggressive approach in securing the northern and eastern provinces, India was the only body that posed a legitimate threat to Sri Lanka’s endeavor through military intervention. Thus, it was vital to keep India aligned with Colombo’s strategy. Minister Rajapakse exclaimed that his brother’s administration understood the gravity of Tamil influence in Indian domestic politics, particularly since the incumbent regime (Congress Party) was aligned with an influential Tamil party, the

DMK. High level officials in Colombo maintained direct lines of communication with their Indian counterparts and met on a regular basis to discuss the war’s progress. This allowed “sensitive issues” to be resolved in a timely manner and helped the “Sri Lankan Armed Forces to continue its military operations absolutely unhindered.”

Contrary to the data analyzed in the previous chapter, the components of Manwaring’s model are strongly present during this campaign of the insurgency (particularly from the years 2005-2009). As a result, we observed the decisive defeat of the LTTE. The project’s hypothesis in the case of Sri Lanka could not be disproved.

Chapter 5: Discussion of the Data

This section of the study deliberately compares the data assembled and analyzed in chapters three and four. Keeping with the format of the project, I will begin with the review of legitimacy and finish with the Role of Intelligence and Information Operations.

As we mentioned earlier, the Sri Lankan government seated in Colombo was a democratically elected body and did not face legitimacy problems in the same sense as an invading foreign country. The threat to Colombo’s moral right to rule began with the fact that the Tigers were not simply an inchoate insurgency seeking to overthrow an incumbent regime. The LTTE maintained a functional government in the northern and eastern parts of the island and fielded a standing army, navy, and (nascent) air force.

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This gave credence to their bid for independence as it proved they could govern and protect their own state. Also, attempts to arbitrate a peaceful political resolution to the conflict were exacerbated by the international community, like Norway, because they often favored the Tigers. This weakened the Sri Lankan government’s position in negotiations as it put an insurgent movement on the same level as Colombo.

The government’s legitimacy improves as a result of 9/11 and LTTE strategic mistakes, like the 2005 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister. Not only did such events help the international community to see the LTTE’s terroristic nature and convince them that the Tigers were not committed to a peaceful end to the conflict, but it gave Colombo a perfect excuse to unilaterally abrogate the cease fire agreement and launch a concerted war effort to destroy the Tigers.

Secondly, is the unity of effort. Sri Lanka’s political leadership between 1995 and 2001 (and up until 2004) struggled to make decisive decisions and implement a comprehensive strategy to deal with the insurgency. This stemmed from the ruling party’s political constraints, which arose from contentions with a divided military, Sinhalese Nationalists, and parliamentary coalition partners with opposing views. This changed in 2005, when Mahinda Rajapakse assumed power. President Rajapakse not only created a strong coalition of partners that were heavily anti-LTTE, but he appoints competent, strongly nationalistic individuals to run the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces. He also co-opts Tamil political parties and paramilitary groups that had been marginalized by Prabhakaran’s northern LTTE faction.
He also authorizes the military leadership to run their day to day operations, removing politics from the conduct of the war. And most importantly, his government remained united under pressure from the international community to cease its assault on the Tigers. From 2006-2009, Colombo consistently provided clear objectives to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and supported their mission in every aspect from the beginning to end.

Thirdly, enhancing the military’s capability to wage a counterinsurgency battle was a decisive factor in the defeat of the rebel movement. The Sri Lankan military during the third Eelam War lacked the requisite manpower and training to effectively combat the LTTE. They could not hold territory and simultaneously pursue insurgents into rebel held areas. Additionally, the senior officer’s corps conventional approach in answering the unconventional threat would only prolong the insurgency. As a result, Sri Lankan efforts suffered from “whack-a-mole” syndrome, where the military would clear an area only to have the Tigers reappear in another.

Through the course of Eelam War IV the government expanded the armed forces, which allowed the Sri Lankan military to attack the Tigers across multiple fronts and to stretch their forces thin. Moreover, the military abandoned traditional conventional strategy and focused training on special operations and small unit tactics; so when the Tigers adopted a conventional strategy believing they could match the combat power projected by Colombo, they inadvertently tilted the balance of power in the government’s favor. Lastly, the Rajapakse administration revamped the Sri Lankan Navy and Air Force and utilized their capabilities to tighten the noose around the
LTTE’s neck. Where the Air Force had traditionally been used as a troop transport service and the Navy a ceremonial organization, they now played integral roles in supporting ground troops engaged with the enemy and destroying LTTE war supplies on the high seas. Expanding the armed forces, providing advanced training to enhance soldier capabilities and discipline, employing a comprehensive strategy, and executing combined service operations made it possible for Colombo to militarily defeat the Tigers in the fourth and final Eelam War.

Unlike other paradigm components, external support to the government of Sri Lanka was strong throughout both periods; however, Colombo expanded their relationships with Beijing, Islamabad, and New Delhi during the fourth Eelam War in order to take greater advantage of the material and political support they were willing to provide. It is only because Colombo lacked a coherent strategy to combat the rebels that they could not exploit foreign assistance until 2005-2006.

Cutting off the LTTE’s international support is arguably the most important factor in this conflict. There are two major reasons why efforts were more successful during the second campaign compared to those in the first. One is the role 9/11 played in changing the international community’s perception of groups that employ terrorist activities in pursuit of their goals. Many foreign nations were increasingly willing to pursue and prosecute LTTE supporters in their respective Tamil Diasporas, which discouraged many Tamil expatriates from providing support. The Tiger’s image as an organization seeking self-determination degenerated into that of a terrorist movement, erecting numerous barriers on their path towards independence.
The second reason rests with Colombo. Prior to 2005, the Sri Lankan government was not so much concerned with destroying the LTTE as they were finding a political resolution to peacefully coexist with them. President Rajapakse’s clarity of objective and comprehensive strategy focusing on the Tiger’s elimination permitted the government to take full advantage of the global community’s willingness to aid Sri Lanka in the dismantling of the LTTE international support structure.

Finally, we compare the role of intelligence and information operations between the two campaigns. During the third Eelam War, Colombo was largely inefficient and ineffective in its efforts to collect and process intelligence. Organizations charged with waging the intelligence war against the Tigers did not have the requisite level of manpower or resources to carry out their daily duties. Moreover, because the local population lacked confidence in the government’s ability to protect them from Tiger cadres operating in their neighborhoods, they often withheld useful information from the security forces. The LTTE also had an extensive international support structure that utilized propaganda to highlight human rights abuses committed by the government of Sri Lanka, undermining Colombo’s legitimacy in the west and emphasizing the Tamil people’s struggle for independence.

However, this would all change between 2001 and 2009. Colombo’s restructuring of the military and its focus on small unit tactics allowed highly skilled special operations teams to infiltrate enemy lines and collect real time intelligence on LTTE activities. The armed forces also augmented these capabilities with UAV’s and aerial reconnaissance flights by the Sri Lankan and Indian air forces.
President Rajapakse also co-opted disenfranchised Tamil political parties (which maintained paramilitary arms) that ran informant networks in the Northern and Eastern parts of the island, restricting the Tiger’s freedom of maneuver on the battlefield and hindering their ability to recruit new fighters. Also, increased confidence in the abilities of the Sri Lankan security forces encouraged locals to provide useful intelligence to the authorities regarding Tiger activities. Lastly, Colombo used the events of 9/11 to paint the LTTE as a terrorist group, stripping away its credibility as an independence movement. This prompted a concerted effort by the global community to aid Colombo in shutting down the Tiger’s world wide support network.

The chart below summarizes the comparisons between the two campaigns. A plus sign indicates that that particular Manwaring component was strongly represented in that given phase. A minus sign means that it was weakly present. The third column uses an upward or downward pointing arrow to show if the specific variable was more or less present between the two periods and an equal sign if it was roughly the same.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm Component</th>
<th>Eelam War III 1995-2001</th>
<th>CFA/ Eelam War IV 2001-2009</th>
<th>Was Component more or less present in the second campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capability and Discipline</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support to Government of Sri Lanka</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting Intl. Support to LTTE</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>^</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Policy Implications

The results of this analysis in some measure support the notion that Manwaring has explanatory power in expositing how some insurgencies end, at least in the case explored here: the government of Sri Lanka’s eventual victory over the LTTE in 2009. It is highly improbable that the United States will ever face a domestic insurgency. But this study does suggest a couple of lessons that are germane to U.S. engagement. First, this study should prompt reflection about the manner in which U.S. policy makers choose to support allies engaged in domestic insurgencies. In late 2007 Washington imposed the Leahy Amendment on Colombo, effectively halting US training and aid to the Sri Lankan armed forces. The premise for this action was that the Sri Lankan military had committed human rights abuses during Eelam War IV. Implementing this measure against an ally may create reservations within other governments engaged in internal wars that partner with America.

Washington’s enforcement of Leahy appears arbitrary and based upon its own interests and agenda. The United State’s recent implementation of the amendment on roughly half a dozen Pakistani military units serves as one example. Despite the fact that Pakistan is a key strategic partner in combating terrorism and eliminating safe havens for insurgents launching attacks in Afghanistan, some analysts believe Leahy was enforced because the U.S. was unsatisfied with the degree of freedom Islamabad
granted them regarding the ability to operate in Pakistan’s border regions. Nevertheless, the U.S. just approved a $2 billion aid package to Pakistan’s armed forces. While this aid is designed to assist other units without histories of rights abuses, it is not a stretch of the imagination to think that such assistance could not find its way to the units affected by Leahy. For example, it is nearly impossible to enforce the amendment if units qualified to receive support operate or train in tandem with a blacklisted unit.  

Saudi Arabia and Israel provide great examples for the U.S.’s arbitrary application of Leahy. Despite the Kingdom’s long list of human rights abuses, like internment without trial and summary executions, Washington just announced a $67 billion rearmament deal with Riyadh. Some analysts believe the U.S.’s concerns with Iran’s ascendancy and American business interests (e.g. defense industry) have caused it to overlook such Saudi abuses. Israel, whose armed forces have been suspected throughout the years of violating the law of armed conflict in their bouts with the Palestinians, just negotiated a contract to purchase 20 new American F-35 fighter jets worth $2.75 billion dollars. Other examples reflecting apparent U.S. bias include our continued support for Colombia’s war against organizations involved in the production and trafficking of narcotics.  

These seemingly hypocritical actions may not only reduce the incentive for foreign regimes to decisively pursue groups within their countries that pose a threat to U.S. national security, but may reduce U.S. influence in some regions as affected

102 (2010 October 31) Freeze on pakistani military aid raises questions over u.s. abuse policy  
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,6154972,00.html  
103 Ibid-footnote applies to entire paragraph
countries might seek assistance from Washington’s competitors. Sri Lanka possesses strategic importance to the US as it straddles major energy transport corridors, neighbors India, and sits just south of the Bay of Bengal and East Asia. It may be beneficial for Washington not to alienate Sri Lanka, particularly as India and China compete for greater regional influence. The removal of the Leahy Amendment was one the main discussion points during Sri Lankan Foreign Minister G.L. Peiris’ visit with Secretary of State Clinton this past summer.104

While human rights are important, the U.S. needs to examine the manner in which it enforces this amendment and the degree to which it is effective. If not, this may encumber our relations with foreign partners and foster indecisiveness where the U.S. seeks decisive, timely, and aggressive action. Washington should not only consider lifting the Leahy ban on Sri Lanka, but it would be wise not to pursue such measures in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan in the future—as some rights groups have advocated.105

Furthermore, Council on Foreign Relations writer Lionel Beehner reminds us that Colombo’s success ran counter to counterinsurgency doctrine’s core element— winning the population’s “hearts and minds.” He explains that the United State’s Afghanistan endeavor struggles with the “Goldilocks” paradox: in which it uses enough force to agitate the local populace but not enough to end the insurgency and win the

war. Breehner is not advocating for indiscriminate violence, like the Soviet’s scorched earth policy during the eighties; however, U.S. policy makers should consider revising the rules of engagement (e.g. use of air power) to give American troops greater leverage in bolstering the lagging capabilities of the nascent Afghan National Army. If American forces cannot help the Afghan government establish a monopoly on violence, it will be exponentially more difficult to implement a political solution favorable to U.S. interests.

If Washington fails to take away relevant lessons from such cases, it’s reasonable to believe that their efforts will continue to be frustrated and that they will fall short of their objectives in current and future endeavors. Otto Von Bismarck once remarked that a fool learns from experience, while a wise man learns from the experience of others. To date, Washington has only proven itself to be a fool.
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