Editorial
                                            
        Tamil Guardian, February 26, 2003
         
        Under
        Pressure
        
        The cease-fire is losing its allure
        
        When it was signed last February, the cease-fire between the Liberation
        Tigers and the Sri Lankan government was, quite rightly, hailed by the
        island's residents and the international community as a significant
        breakthrough in the Norwegian peace process. Although the guns in South
        Asia's longest war had in fact been silent for over two prior months
        amid unilateral cease-fires, the new mutual agreement went beyond a mere
        cessation of offensive action: it provided for an active process of
        normalisation of civilian life. In particular, it set out the phases for
        the restoration of normalcy including the ending of military
        restrictions on fishing by the Tamil populace and the withdrawal of
        security forces personnel from occupied homes, schools, places of
        worship and other public places. The agreement also included an
        international monitoring mechanism.
        
        Understandably, hopes were therefore high. The United National Front (UNF)
        government's dramatic victory in the parliamentary elections of December
        2001 on a mandate for peace through negotiations with the LTTE, and the
        visibly rapid progress of the Norwegian peace process fuelled
        unprecedented public optimism. But one long year on, this has largely
        evaporated to be replaced by cynicism at best and outright
        disillusionment at worst. The causes, as this newspaper and the rest of
        the Tamil press has been repeatedly pointing out throughout the past
        year, are clear: the Sri Lankan military has refused to honour the
        normalisation aspects of the truce. There are two resulting effects.
        Firstly, the truce is now contemptuously lumped with umpteen past
        agreements that the Sinhala leadership signed with the Tamils and then
        nonchalantly abrogated. Secondly, the seemingly unenforceable cease-fire
        agreement has singularly failed to alleviate the suffering of hundreds
        of thousands of people who remain displaced while the Sri Lankan
        military remains in occupation of their towns and villages.
        
        Then it got worse: with the timetable for withdrawal and lifting
        ofrestrictions rendered utterly irrelevant, the issue of normalisation
        was taken up at the direct talks between both sides. Notwithstanding the
        controversy generated when the Sri Lanka Army demanded the LTTE
        surrender its weapons before troops permit Tamil civilians back into
        their homes and properties, several new agreements on normalisation have
        also been reached and then simply forgotten by the government on its
        delegates' return to Colombo. The UNF's excuse - that President
        Chandrika Kumaratunga, not Parliament, retains control of the military -
        is now ridiculous. When agreements reached by negotiators are simply
        ignored by their principals, the credibility of the former - and thereby
        the viability of the peace process itself - inevitably suffers.
        
        Affected sections of Tamil civil society are now staging repeated
        protests and demonstrations against the non-implementation of the truce.
        The few public places that Sri Lankan troops begrudgingly vacated are
        unusable for a multitude of reasons, not least the proximity of the new
        military positions to the old. Meanwhile a handful of displaced people
        have been able to return to their homes but the overwhelming majority of
        them cannot. This, and the suspiciously slow pace of reconstruction and
        rehabilitation in the north and east, are primarily responsible for the
        prevailing disillusionment amongst the Tamil people. The
        Sinhala-dominated parts of the island are, however, reaping a
        substantial truce dividend: tourism and economic activity is
        accelerating while conflict-related tensions have completely dissipated
        in the south.
        
        Even the only successful component of the cease-fire agreement, the
        cessation of offensive actions, has not been flawless. Apart from the
        major standoff - on the anniversary of the truce - between Sri Lanka
        Navy personnel and LTTE cadres, the exact circumstances of which are
        being ascertained as this issue goes to print, there have been far more
        serious incidents: Tamil, Muslim and - in error - Sinhala fishermen have
        been fired on by the Navy, leading to deaths and sinking of civilian
        vessels. LTTE political activists, permitted to work in government held
        areas  under the truce, have regularly been arrested and assaulted
        by Sri Lankan military personnel. The disarming of Tamil paramilitaries
        working with the military has, meanwhile, not been done. Little wonder
        then that as the anniversary passes tensions are rising in some places
        between troops on both sides and between Sinhalese personnel and Tamil
        residents.
        
        On the other hand, the truce has largely held with only a very small
        number of deaths amongst combatants caused by enemy action. This is
        undoubtedly due to the work of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
        which has intervened to preempt incidents and defuse those underway. But
        the monitors are also under justifiable criticism for remaining silent
        as large and important parts of the cease-fire agreement - with regards
        normalisation - are simply being ignored or insufficiently addressed.
        The central issue, for those  concerned with the achieving peace in
        Sri Lanka, ought to be how to restore Tamil public confidence in the
        cease-fire agreement and thereby bolster support for the peace process.
        We argue that international support is, as ever, key. Firstly, Colombo
        should be persuaded to ensure its military ceases to block civilians'
        return to their homes. Secondly, the reconstruction effort, presently
        mired in Sri Lanka's traditional bureaucracy, should be expedited with
        foreign assistance. In the meantime, the cease-fire is under
        increasingly effective pressure from the Sinhala nationalists in Colombo
        and the extremists within the Sri Lankan military.