Tigers outline their position to Norway

“I am writing this letter to you to seek your government’s continuous engagement as the facilitator to help find a stable peace and a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict”

- LTTE leader Prabakharan’s letter
 of January 1, 2002 to Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

New Year 2002 has dawned with commendable forward movement in the nation’s trek towards its peace destination. The best and most optimistic indicator of this was Norway resuming its intermediary role for peace process five again. The first major step in this respect was the visit of a Norwegian delegation to Britain. A meeting was held on January 4, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Political Adviser and Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham in London where the Tiger ideologue enunciated his movement’s stance on peace related issues clearly. The next phase was the visit of the same delegation to Colombo on January 10.

Oslo’s facilitatory efforts had come to a halt last year after Erik Solheim was sidelined in a bilateral move taken by Colombo and Oslo consequent to objections raised by the Sri Lankan government against the Norwegian special peace envoy. The LTTE protested against this joint action by two parties in what was essentially a “tripartite” exercise. The situation was further compounded by elections in Norway and the political crisis in Sri Lanka that ultimately led to fresh elections.

India’s blessings

The new United National Front Government led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe announced that Norway’s facilitatory role would resume and took steps to that effect. The Norwegian envoy in Colombo Jon Westborg was summoned for two separate meetings by Wickremesinghe and his Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando in Colombo where the situation was reviewed.

Wickremesinghe however did not want to move forward on this matter before meeting Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari and other Indian leaders and officials. While Wickremesinghe wanted India’s assistance and advice for its efforts to resolve the protracted ethnic conflict Tyronne Fernando went one step further and speculated about India being asked to take over Norway’s facilitatory role.

Wickremesinghe accompanied by Fernando undertook his Indian trip from December 22 to December 24. Apart from the Indian Premier Wickremesinghe met several others including Home Minister Advani, External Minister Jaswant Singh, Industries Minister Maran, Opposition Leader Sonia Gandhi and AIADMK leader Jayalalitha Jeyaram.

Seek and you shall find

It was made clear to Wickremesinghe in New Delhi that while India was fully supportive of the peace process in Sri Lanka and was prepared to render required assistance it had no desire to be involved directly as a third party intermediary. Wickremesinghe was advised to proceed on the path to peace by continuing to rely on Norwegian facilitation. New Delhi expected to be kept fully informed of all relevant developments.

After returning to Sri Lanka Wickremesinghe with India’s “blessings” moved quickly on the matter. He spoke directly on the telephone to his Norwegian counterpart Kjell Magne Bondevik and requested Norway’s facilitatory assistance again. Thereafter a formal request in writing was sent to Oslo. Wickremesinghe also held a news conference and announced that Norwegian facilitation was on. He also made it known that his government had no objections to Erik Solheim being involved in the peace process again. According to Wickremesinghe the inclusion of Solheim was something to be decided by the Norwegian government. The stage was set for resumption of the peace process but for one factor - the LTTE.

Using its unofficial links with the Tigers it established some rapport and requested a formal LTTE invitation also. The LTTE required some time to take stock of the situation. Meanwhile Oslo informed eager press-persons that no forward movement was possible without an official LTTE invitation. There was no question of a bilateral peace process concerning Colombo and Oslo alone. If the peace process was to get off the ground again it had to be clearly a trilateral effort and for this a Tiger request was officially required.

That response came on New Year’s Day when LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan wrote to the Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik and called for Norway’s continuous engagement as facilitator. “I am writing this letter to you to seek your government’s continuous engagement as the facilitator to help find a stable peace and a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict” the Tiger chief wrote. The LTTE released a press statement on January 2, outlining the contents of its letter after ascertaining that it had been formally received and accepted by Oslo.

Unbanning the LTTE

The next stage was for a Norwegian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesson to go to Britain and meet LTTE political adviser and chief negotiator Anton Balasingham in London. Another minor hurdle had to be cleared first. The LTTE wanted the British government to clarify its position on talks first. The British government had banned LTTE activity on its soil. Against that backdrop Balasingham wanted an official assurance that his participating openly in discussions as the accredited LTTE representative would not constitute an offence under the new anti-terrorist laws.

This guarantee was provided by the British authorities and also explicitly released to the media through official spokespersons. It was also implied that even high-level talks between government and Tiger representatives could be held in Britain if necessary. In effect a country that had banned the LTTE as ‘terrorist’ was acknowledging the organisation’s pivotal role in the peace process and “unbanning” it in a limited sense to help promote peace in Sri Lanka. Thus Western nations adopting an uncompromising attitude against entities supposedly involved in “terrorism” were differentiating. As far as Sri Lanka was concerned peace was not to be achieved through attempts at annihilating the LTTE but by fostering talks with the Tigers aimed at a negotiated settlement.

Apart from Helgesson other members of the delegation were Erik Solheim and a foreign ministry official Kjirste Tromsdal. Both were old hands in Sri Lanka and involved in all aspects of the previous peace effort. The meeting with Balasingham was cordial and constructive. The LTTE stance on peace was outlined clearly at the three-hour meeting.

During discussions in London the LTTE explained its position towards unilateral measures undertaken by the new government in Colombo about resolving the conflict. While welcoming the moves in principle the Tigers also made constructive suggestions. It was accepted that several preliminary measures were necessary to pave the way for regular negotiations. These consist of many like overseeing the removal of the economic embargo, setting up an international monitoring committee, transforming the current temporary cease-fire into a permanent one within mutually agreed terms of reference, codes of conduct to be followed by both parties during cease-fire formulating a joint memorandum of understanding, discussions on de-proscription, formulating the framework, agenda and itinerary for direct talks etc.

The LTTE made it known that it was keenly awaiting the government’s moves in lifting the restrictions on transporting essential items and food etc into the LTTE controlled areas. The government had announced that greater inflow of goods would start by January 15. The Tigers expected a meaningful process to commence from that date. Thereafter its scope and scale could be enlarged gradually. The LTTE also awaited government moves in removing restrictions on fishing, agriculture and transport in the Tamil areas. A point emphasised was that mere removal of restrictions on paper would not suffice and that proper implementation of the new measures was necessary.

Balasingham stated clearly that the LTTE’s original position about de-escalating the conflict, removing burdens on the Tamil people and creating a conducive climate and congenial atmosphere for talks was very much valid. Only it was not pressing any connected issue now because the new government was approaching the matter unilaterally. This was a welcome feature from the Tamil point of view. Nevertheless the LTTE was monitoring developments keenly and would make constructive suggestions when necessary. It was stressed however that the government should expedite matters as far as possible and usher in speedy normalcy to the Tamil areas.

Ushering in normalcy

The Tigers also reiterated that de-proscription was an essential prerequisite for commencing direct talks with the government. It was accepted however that there was much ground to be covered before the question of negotiations regarding core issues arose. The important issue at hand was to usher in normalcy and stabilise a non-conflictual situation. The LTTE was also willing to examine proposals such as setting up an interim administration for the Tamil regions if and when the opportunity arose. It was important now to devise procedures through which the current cessation of hostilities declared by both sides separately could be transformed harmonised into a durable cease-fire.

Preventing the collapse of the cease-fire

The LTTE welcomed Oslo drafting a memorandum of understanding to that effect. It was willing to sign one along with the Colombo government and set in motion a permanent cease-fire. The Tigers submitted a set of suggestions that would help formulate a framework to govern the cease-fire. Given past experiences where cease-fires collapsed the LTTE was extra -careful this time. The purpose was to devise procedures that would prevent immediate collapse of the cease-fire if an unfortunate mishap occurred and streamline procedures that would minimise opportunities for such mishaps to occur.

In that respect the LTTE made concrete proposals like agreeing on segregated areas of control for both sides in a post - cease-fire scenario and the setting up of “neutral” zones separating both sides physically. Clear rules of passage were to be drafted to govern movement of personnel by either side to the other. This was specifically related to recent tensions in the East where Tiger cadres crossing over to government areas were detained by security personnel.

In a related development, rules of conduct for both sides to follow during cease-fire were also mooted. It was suggested that precise rules should be formulated to clearly define what constitutes a ‘cease-fire’ violation. This entailed a set of ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ for both sides. This governed movements and duties of both sides as well as making preparations for war.

A monitoring committee to oversee the cease-fire was also necessary. This could comprise international and local representatives. The LTTE stressed that time was of the essence in evolving a cease-fire. Although it was prepared to extend its unilateral cessation of hostilities further it was quite unhealthy to prolong “temporary” and limited hostility cessations. Some unexpected development could occur particularly in the context of an assortment of forces trying to sabotage peace. Therefore speedy action should be taken by Oslo to bring about a cease-fire.

Going against the tide

The LTTE also objected strongly to statements made by the new Defence Minister Tilak Marapone at the Diyatalawa academy passing out parade. His assertion that the new government was prepared to provide the armed forces with “all the necessary assistance by way of weapons and other means to wipe out LTTE terrorism from this land” went completely against the climate of peace. Moreover there were disturbing reports of military preparations like recruitment, arms purchases, military constructions etc..

It was also pointed out that a more elaborate and comprehensive approach towards the negotiating process could be finalised only after Balasingham meets Prabakharan on a one to one basis. For this the Tigers require Balasingham to communicate frequently and freely with the LTTE leadership based in the Wanni particularly its elusive supremo Velupillai Prabakharan to engage in spadework discussions of a confidential nature before regular bilateral talks commence.

Making arrangements

For this Balasingham cannot rely on current communication modes as at present and needs personal face to face meetings with Prabakharan. It is known that communications between the LTTE hierarchy in the northern mainland of the Wanni and its overseas branches abroad are conducted through satellite telephone, facsimile, electronic mail and “special” couriers. It is against this backdrop that the LTTE made two inter-related requests seeking Indian assistance for talks.

Firstly it wants its 64 year old theoretician Balasingham to reside in Chennai for health and security reasons. The LTTE’s accredited chief negotiator is not in very good health as he is a diabetic on daily insulin and also recovering from a complicated kidney transplant operation and suffers from coronary and renal conditions. Balasingham and wife Ad‚le Anne left Sri Lanka clandestinely by ship and made their way to London primarily because of his deteriorating health. The Tigers want arrangements made for Anton Balasingham and spouse Ad‚le Anne now based in the British capital of London to relocate temporarily to Chennai in order to commute easily for regular consultations with the LTTE leadership in the Sri Lankan northern mainland of the Wanni before and during negotiations.

It would be a difficult security risk for Balasingham to undertake periodical trips from London to Wanni via Colombo for this purpose. At the same time his fragile health requires intensive medical care that is not readily available in the impoverished and neglected Wanni region. Security reasons prevent him staying elsewhere in the Island also at this juncture. The Athurugiriya arrests illustrate this clearly. Therefore the LTTE wants permission from the Indian government for the Balasingham’s to reside temporarily in Chennai.

The LTTE position is that Balasingham could shuttle back and forth from Chennai to the Wanni by helicopter to assist in finalising necessary matters as a prelude to direct talks. It is hoped, said sources, that through this device it would be possible for the Tiger Chief Negotiator to avail himself of sophisticated medical care in Chennai and also communicate directly with Prabakharan whenever required without security risk.

If Colombo, Oslo and New Delhi agree to this arrangement the second aspect of the Tiger request would become operative. This is to request permission and arrangements from the Indian government for talks between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE to be held in India preferably a Southern city like Chennai , Thiruvananthapuram or Bangalore.

Heartened by the positive responses

The rationale for this request is that a high powered LTTE delegation comprising its military commanders as well as political leaders is required to participate in these talks. The Tiger representatives also need to report back to the Tiger high command for further consultations and obtaining additional input during talks. It would be practically difficult and security-wise risky for the LTTE team to move to and from Sri Lanka to a European destination for talks. It may also be necessary to vary the delegational composition at times for specific purposes. Also the abiding presence and advice of Balasingham is required for talks.Under these circumstances the LTTE would like talks to be held in India to enable its representatives to shuttle freely and conveniently and would like arrangements to be made with New Delhi for it.

It is learnt that Balasingham while explaining this position clearly to the Norwegians last week emphasised that his organisation and the Tamil people were “heartened “ by the positive response in New Delhi to Lankan Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Indian visit last December. India had promised all assistance and support to the Oslo facilitated peace process and so it was very possible that New Delhi would agree to this special arrangement as a cordial and crucial gesture of goodwill Balasingham reportedly stated Wickremesinghe establishing firm rapport with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, and other Indian leader is also expected to help immensely in getting Indian consent to this proposed arrangement it was pointed out.

Abundance of goodwill

The LTTE also stated that it had no objections to Indian non-participant observers at the direct talks if and when negotiations are held in India. Although the LTTE does not welcome any country that has banned it including India to be a direct third party intermediary on the grounds of being perceived as partial it is amenable to Indian observers if India hosts the talks. The LTTE remains banned in India from 1992 May onwards. While Norway would facilitate India as “hosts” would observe the talks. It is however possible that the LTTE and its supporters in India would continue their efforts to get the Indian ban reviewed.

The Norwegians were expected to convey the LTTE viewpoint to all concerned in Colombo Forward movement on this issue depends on the response initially of Sri Lanka and later India to these requests. The Tigers have also drawn attention to the fact that given the abundance of goodwill among the Sinhala majority community as well as the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka towards India having an Indian city as the venue for talks should be very welcome in the Island. Security concerns, convenience and proximity to homeland are seen as the reasons behind the LTTE’s requests. New Delhi’s response will be determined by a number of factors keeping the “enlightened self-interests” of India as the paramount consideration.