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An
Exploration... Sathyam
Commentary, New Years Day 1999 by Nadesan Satyendra
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"Every
dispute has a history; we have been sending messages to them and they
have been sending messages to us, even if only by silence or by a
professed refusal to negotiate. Positions have been staked out.
Proposals have been made and rejected. One thing we know for sure: if
the conflict is continuing, whatever we have been saying and doing so
far has not worked. It has not produced the result we want, or we would
have turned our attention to other matters by now..." -
(Beyond Machiavelli - Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman & Andrea
Kupfer Schnieder, Harvard University Press, 1994) Introduction
| International Law & the State | International Law & Self
Determination | International Law & Armed Resistance | International
Law & Politics | International Mediation | BATNA - Best Alternative
to a Negotiated Arrangement | Thimpu Talks | Waging War for Peace | Need
for a win-win approach | Sinhala interests | Tamil interests |
Telescoping Two Processes: independence and inter - dependence | The
demand for Tamil
Eelam is an inter-national question... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Introduction During
the past decade and more, there has been no shortage of expressions of
concern at the heavy toll in human suffering caused by the conflict in
the island of Sri Lanka. It is not a matter for surprise, therefore,
that during the same period, questions have been raised, from time
to time, as to the feasibility of a political solution to the conflict. Conflict
resolution 'specialists' appear, non governmental organisations
undertake behind the scene 'proximity talks', 'facilitators' surface and
calls for international 'mediation' are made, but these
efforts have ended not only without a bang but, often,
without even a whimper. Of course, Sardar K.M.Pannikar's remarks in
Principles and Practice of Diplomacy in 1956 remain relevant even today: ''
It must be remembered that in international affairs things are not often
what they seem to be... Behind a smokescreen of hostile propaganda,
diplomatic moves may be taking place indicating a better understanding
of each other's position...'' Nonetheless,
the fundamental reason for the failure of past attempts
toresolve the conflict may be attributed to the diametrically opposed
nature of the goals that each party to the conflict seeks to achieve.
These goals may be simply stated. The Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam seek to establish an independent Tamil Eelam
state. The Sri Lanka government is intent on securing the territorial
integrity of the Sri Lanka state. The
LTTE is committed to securing independence for the people of Tamil
Eelam. Sri Lanka is committed to securing rule by the majority
within the confines of the existing state. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International
Law & the State Each
party claims to have international law and 'justice' on its side.
However the political reality is that their claims will not be
determined by an international court of competent jurisdiction - because
no such court exists. The jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice may be invoked only by a state. Non state nations do not 'become'
states as a result of a binding judgement delivered by a court of law on
the legality of their claims. It was perhaps this, which led James
Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of
Cambridge to comment in 1979: "Traditionally,
the criteria for statehood have been regarded as resting solely on
considerations of effectiveness. Entities with a reasonably defined
territory, a permanent population, a more or less stable government and
a substantial degree of independence of other States have been treated
as States. Other factors, such as permanence, willingness to obey
international law, and recognition, have usually been regarded as of
rather peripheral importance." (James Crawford - The Creation of
States in International Law - Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) A
defining characteristic of a state is that it enjoys a monopoly of
legitimate coercive power within its territorial boundaries. In the end,
though the strength of the security forces may vary from one state to
another, no state exists which does not have its own security forces.
The police and the army of a state are the ultimate repositories of this
coercive power and in a democracy, the army and police function within a
constitutional frame endorsed by the will of the people and secured by
the rule of law. History
shows that states have acquired this monopoly of legitimate coercive
power, by political struggle (often armed struggle) and not by
judgements of courts of law. The countervailing claims of the
parties to the armed conflict in the island of Sri Lanka will not
be decided in the playing fields of the courts of justice in
New York, New Delhi nor for that matter at the annual sessions of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights. That
is not to say that each party to the conflict will not continue to claim
to have international law on its side. International law and
human rights provide useful platforms for mobilising support for one's
cause and creating the political space within which one may continue to
resort to arms to secure one's objectives. States as well liberation
movements have a felt need to act according to law - or at least to be
seen to be acting according to law. However, it would be wrong to
dismiss this as simply a cynical tactic. In the end, an appeal to law,
justice and equity influences - because it is also an appeal to the
essential goodness in people, to their humanity. It is therefore, an
appeal not without inherent power. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International
Law & Self Determination The
LTTE relies on the political principle of self determination and
contends that this political principle, which is rooted in the
democratic right of a people to rule themselves, is also a legal right
in international law. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, relies on the
international law principle of the territorial integrity of existing
states and asserts that the Tamil people already have the right to
self determination because Tamils in the island enjoy the democratic
right of universal franchise, within the framework of a Constitution
which protects human rights. The LTTE replies that the practise of
'democracy' within the confines of a unitary state has led to rule by a
permanent, alien, Sinhala majority. International
law experts are then drawn into the debate and the differences are
refined - and 'shaded'. Faced with reconciling the inalienable right of
a people to self determination with the territorial integrity
of existing states, attempts are made to evolve the concept of 'internal
self determination'. The example of South Africa is cited as the way
forward. "The
right of the South African people as a whole to self determination, as
manifested in this constitution, does not preclude, within the framework
of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self
determination of any community sharing a common culture and language
heritage within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other
way, determined by national legislation." (Article 234 of the South
African Constitution) This
attempt is then resisted by those who insist that self determination, if
it is to mean anything at all, must mean exactly what it says - self
determination i.e. a people have the right to themselves freely
choose their political status and that includes the right to secede, if
they so choose. A people cannot be told: "You have the right to
freely choose your political status, but you may exercise it only
in the way we tell you i.e. within the territorial entity of the
existing state". Again, the
constitutionalist who propounds the theory of 'internal' self
determination, is compelled to confront the political reality of the
power that flows through the barrel of the gun when asked: who will
control the army within an 'internal self determination' dispensation? The
words of John Stuart Mill, uttered 125 years ago may help to focus
minds: "Free
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different
nationalities... Above all, the grand and only effectual security in the
last resort against the despotism of the government is in that case
wanting: the sympathy of the army with the people. Soldiers to whose
feelings half or three fourths of the subjects of the same government
are foreigners, will have no more scruple in mowing them down, and no
more reason to ask the reason why, than they would have in doing the
same thing against declared enemies. (John Stuart Mill: Considerations
on Representative Government. London 1872) In
truth, even a constitutional right of secession is nothing without the
force of arms to back it. After all, Joseph Stalin's oppressive rule of
the nations of the Soviet Union flourished under a constitution which
proclaimed the right of each federal unit to secede! ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International
law & armed resistance Again,
the LTTE contends that Sri Lanka's resort to arms to quell a
struggle for self determination is unlawful. Sri Lanka asserts that it
is entitled, in law, to use armed force to secure its territorial
integrity. The LTTE contends that its own resort to arms is lawful
because it was a last resort against oppressive Sinhala rule and points
out to the series of broken pacts and to the Sixth Amendment to the Sri
Lanka constitution which outlawed the parliamentary political struggle for
a separate state. The
LTTE asserts that there is an armed conflict in the island to which the
Geneva Conventions apply, that Sri Lanka has committed gross
and systematic violations of the humanitarian laws of armed conflict and
genocide, and contends that this is state terrorism. Sri
Lanka insists that the conflict is simply an internal disturbance,
within its territorial boundaries, refuses to recognise the
applicability of the international humanitarian law of armed
conflict and refuses to acknowledge, for instance, that it is obliged
(by that law) to take prisoners of war. Since the conflict is an
internal disturbance, Sri Lanka argues that the resort to arms by the
LTTE constitutes terrorism. It points out to violations by the LTTE of
the humanitarian law of armed conflict and asserts that the LTTE is
a terrorist organisation. It
is not only Sri Lanka that has categorised the LTTE as a
terrorist organisation. The United States has done the same. Canada has
taken action against the LTTE Canadian representative Sureshan
Manickavasagam on the basis that he is a member of a terrorist
organisation. But
in each case, the categorisation was made by the executive wing of the
government concerned. And the laws under which the executive wing has so
decided, preclude the courts from themselves finding, on the facts, whether
the LTTE is a terrorist organisation or not. In
the case of Sri Lanka, judicial review of the categorisation of the
LTTE (as a terrorist organisation) is expressly excluded. In the case of
the U.S.A. and Canada, though judicial review is not excluded, such review
of the action taken by the executive wing is limited to determining
whether the executive had acted arbitrarily or wholly unreasonably. And,
the courts in the U.S.A., in Canada (and, for that matter, in the United
Kingdom) have always shown a great reluctance to interfere with
executive discretion in the area of 'claimed' national security. Courts
take the view that where 'national security' is threatened, executive
discretion relating to the very life of the nation is involved and this
is not a matter where the judiciary should supplant the view of the
executive. It is said that the Constitution has empowered the executive
(and not the judiciary) to decide matters relating to national security.
Again, it is urged that the information on which the executive
acted, cannot be made available to a court, to be tested by cross
examination and a decision made according to law - because to do so
would be to put at risk the national security apparatus of the state,
which must function in secrecy. Further,
even apart from this procedural tangle, what is terrorism? Is all
resort to violence to secure political ends, terrorism? Or should
the violence be indiscriminate and intended to cause 'terror' and
directed to secure political ends? Is
it that a people ruled by an alien people cannot, in law, resort to
arms to secure freedom? Is a state entitled to use force to quell a
people's struggle for self determination? Is
a state which stockpiles nuclear bombs a terrorist state, because
it seeks to use the threat of the terror of a nuclear
holocaust to secure its political goals such as the preservation of
democracy? Again,
does a state or an organisation which on occasion resorts to terror as a
weapon, thereby become a 'terrorist' state or a 'terrorist' organisation?
For instance did the USA bombing of Libya, a few years ago, render
the USA a terrorist state? Or would it be necessary to establish that
the dominant purpose for which the state or organisation exists, is
the use of terror? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International
law & politics International
law will of course, make its slow (and measured) progress to
addressing these issues. International law itself is largely dependent
on state practice. After all, for many centuries, international law had
denied the right of a colonial people to freedom. Eventually, the
colonial rulers weakened by two world wars, were no longer able to
impose their rule and the political principle of self determination
began to secure reluctant recognition in international law. In
1960, the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1960 which supported the
view that the right of self determination was now a legal principle, won
the support of eighty nine states but significantly, there were 9
abstentions viz: Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France,
Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United
States. International law followed upon the success of struggles for
freedom - and not the other way around. Mahatma
Gandhi did not found India's struggle for freedom on the 'international
law principle' of the right to self determination. If he had, he may
have been met with the objection (in the 1930s) that no such
general principle existed in international law, though today some legal
scholars contend that the right of self determination is a part of
the jus cogens. However,
despite the views expressed by such legal scholars, we find that
those who abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1960,
are now engaged in attempts to limit the legal right of self
determination to those earlier colonial struggles. Compelled to
reconcile themselves with the success of the colonial struggles for
freedom, these countries now propound the theory of 'internal' self
determination and seek (in the name of stability) to preserve the
territorial boundaries of the patch work states of the fourth
world. The shared need to protect existing state boundaries leads
them to find common cause with those to whom the colonial ruler had
transferred power. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ International
mediation If
recourse to international law will not resolve the conflict in the
island, then a call for international mediation raises other
important issues. In
so far as Sri Lanka is concerned, to agree to international mediation
would be to agree at the very commencement of the talking process that
the conflict is not an internal conflict but an 'inter-national'
conflict. Sri Lanka may take the view that to accept such international
'mediation' or 'facilitation' would be to concede a major premise of the
demand for Tamil Eelam and further that the LTTE call for mediation is
simply a tactic to secure the political space to continue the struggle
for an independent Tamil Eelam. The
conclusion of the Christian Michelsen Institute Conference sponsored by
the Norwegian Government in February 1996 reflected similar concerns: "Given
the separatist nature of the original conflict, full recognition of the
LTTE as representing the 'Tamil nation' is not the issue. If that were
accorded as a procedural issue in the negotiations, substantive
negotiations would not be necessary since LTTE would have obtained its
principal aim. " Again,
given the shared interest of many existing states to secure existing
state boundaries, from which country would a 'neutral' mediator come
from? And what will be the substance of the via media that a mediator
may suggest or find acceptable? In the end, it is this latter
question that may well prove vital. The
parties to the conflict will need to have some assurance as to the
spectrum of possible solutions that may be on offer before they agree to
a genuine talking process. Sophisticated foreign policy advisers to
governments may raise issues similar to those raised at the Christian
Michelsen Institute Conference and may want to be persuaded that the
call for 'international mediation' is not simply a tactic to secure
political space for a continuation of the armed struggle for an
independent Tamil Eelam. Sufficient,
perhaps has been said to show that there may be a need to go beyond
rhetorical appeals to 'international law', and 'international
mediation' and look at more effective approaches to a
resolution of the conflict in the island of Sri Lanka. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ BATNA
- Best Alternative to a Negotiated Arrangement Some
acronyms help to focus minds on the obvious. BATNA is one of them.
It was coined by Roger Fisher, the best selling author of Getting to
Yes. BATNA stands for the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Arrangement.
A party to a conflict will negotiate in good faith only if it believes
that such negotiations will yield a result better than its BATNA.
Otherwise, it will simply use the negotiation process to either reduce
its opponent's BATNA or increase its own BATNA. The
Northern Ireland peace process serves as an useful illustration. For the
United Kingdom, its 'Best Alternative to a Negotiated Arrangement', was
to continue facing IRA attacks in the mainland, including London and
Manchester with rising insurance premia and the costs of maintaining a
military presence in Ulster. If this BATNA was preferable to anything
that was achievable at the negotiating table, then the UK would have
insisted that the Northern Ireland question was an internal matter and
would have continued to rely on its armed forces to annihilate the IRA.
Again for the Sinn Fein, its 'Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Arrangement' was to continue with the effort to rid Northern Ireland of
British rule and of the better equipped and stronger British Army. If
this BATNA was preferable to anything that was seen as achievable at the
negotiating table, then Sinn Fein may have yet participated in the
talks, but not in good faith. Each
party will need to determine for itself whether its BATNA is preferable
to anything that may be achievable at the negotiating table. This means
not only that each will need to make a careful assessment of each others
BATNA but also an equally careful assessment of the spectrum of possible
solutions which may be achievable in a negotiating process. It is only
then that each may be able to make an informed decision on the question
whether its BATNA is preferable to anything that may be achievable at
the negotiating table. If
a party takes the view that its BATNA is preferable to anything that may
be achievable at a negotiating table, then the talking process will be a
sham and simply a 'tactic'. The talking process will be used
by that party, simply to justify and secure legitimacy for the stand
that it has already taken - and reduce its opponent's BATNA. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Thimpu
talks That
which happened, at Thimpu in 1985 is illustrative. At Thimpu, the
Tamil militant movement secured a measure of legitimacy by participating
in direct talks with a specially appointed Minister of the Sri Lanka
government. Significantly, the Tamil delegation declined to submit
any constitutional proposal for the resolution of the conflict. They
feared that to have done so would have meant a disavowal of the demand
for an independent Tamil Eelam state and that such disavowal would be
used by Sri Lanka to undermine the struggle for which so many had given
their lives. The Tamil delegation suggested instead a framework for
talks which have now come to be known as the Thimpu principles i.e. recognition
of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nationality recognition
of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon recognition
of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation The
Tamil delegation called upon Sri Lanka to submit proposals which
recognised these principles. The Sri Lanka government by making
proposals on the basis of establishing District Councils, sought to
create the impression that it was acting 'reasonably', but without
causing prejudice to its own objective of securing the territorial
integrity of the Sri Lanka state and rule by the majority at the centre.
Its concern was that any relaxation in central control will lead to
eventual separation - sooner rather than later. Both
Sri Lanka and the Tamil militant movements were reluctant participants
in the Thimpu 'negotiating' process. In truth, there were no
negotiations, but set speeches delivered 'at' one another. The parties
to the talks had been frog marched to Thimpu under pressure from Rajiv
Gandhi's India. Perhaps, not unnaturally, each party directed its
efforts to ensure that when the talks failed, the other party would be
blamed for the breakdown. In this way, each sought to ensure that the
renewed resort to arms by each, would secure added support. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Waging
war for peace It
was the same process that was played out again during the Premadasa
talks in 1989/90. At an International Alert sponsored seminar in
Switzerland in 1996, Bradman Weerakoone who had functioned as
Presidential Adviser to Sri Lanka President Premadasa was forthright in
his comments about the talks: "Premadasa
realised that 'the moment of truth' would arrive when the last of the
IPKF soldiers left the North East. Who would fill the law and order gap
thereafter? The Sri Lanka army, who had been in barracks for the years
since July 1987, or the LTTE 'boys' who had been preparing themselves
for the 'liberation of their motherland' ... (Premadasa's) final
option could have been straight out of Machiavelli or more likely
Kautilya. That was that after the IPKF was out of the country he would
turn the refreshed and renewed Sri Lankan forces on the weak LTTE, rout
them completely, eliminate Prabhakaran and re-establish law and order,
good governance, peace and prosperity over the North East and the whole
of Sri Lanka... I am inclined to think that in his final grand design
this last option would have been very appealing... Why were.... critical
political issues left to drift and not addressed in the decisive and
speedy manner that was one of Premadasa's characteristics? I am now
increasingly inclined to the view that he simply did not want to do
so." President
Kumaratunga was equally frank about the 1994/95 negotiations when
she declared truthfully on 20 August 1995: "I
have studied and acquired considerable knowledge on guerrilla warfare
when I was a student in Paris, and we knew how they would behave. We
conducted talks on the basis that the LTTE would not agree to any
peaceful settlement and lay down arms." (Sinhala owned Sri Lanka
Sunday Times, 20 August 1995) Today,
Sri Lanka talks of 'devolution' and wages war for 'peace' to 'militarily
weaken' the LTTE - if necessary, by attacking the Tamil
civilian population and in this way reduce LTTE's BATNA i.e. its ability
to resist the Sri Lanka armed forces. The LTTE, by its heroism and
determination seeks to demonstrate that the Tamil armed resistance
cannot be destroyed and that the mounting cost of the war will continue
to weaken Sri Lanka's material resources and the man power of its armed
forces and so reduce Sri Lanka's 'Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Arrangement' i.e. to carry on the war. In
the meantime, ever increasing number of lives, both Tamil and Sinhala
continue to be lost, human suffering continues in increasing
proportions, and the two peoples are becoming increasingly brutalised. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Need
for a win-win approach To point out all this is to, hopefully, build a platform for meaningful dialogue from which we may go forward. The political reality is that any meaningful attempt at conflict resolution will need to secure a win-win result. However 'win-win' is not some modern day mantra which when repeated often enough brings peace. The Tamil claim for independence and Sri Lanka's insistence on its territorial integrity appear mutually exclusive. How then do we move towards a win-win result? When
a win-win approach is suggested, often the knee jerk response is
that one or other of the parties (or both of them) should
compromise on their goals. Faced with diametrically opposed positions,
it easy to conclude that something must give and that the only way out
is to explore the whole area of what is ‘fair and just’. This then
is the path of
district councils, provincial councils, regional councils, the unit of
devolution, the extent of devolution, federalism, confederation and
slogans such as 'Peace with Justice'. Again
even if one side makes ‘concessions’, the other side will perceive
the shift as simply a tactic to re group and that in reality there is no
shift in the long term position. Efforts are then made by each party to
secure that any ‘arrangement’ that may be agreed upon does not
provide a platform for the other party to achieve its long term goals.
Each side questions the good faith of the other and accusations are made
that the other side cannot be trusted. The history of earlier broken
pacts and negotiation break downs is then regurgitated to buttress the
allegations of bad faith and the attempt to resolve the conflict ends in
the same way as the earlier efforts - in failure. It
will be more useful to look behind the stated positions of the parties
and try to clarify and understand the interests that each party
seeks to protect. Stated positions do not materialise from thin
air. Behind the stated positions of the parties, are the interests that
these stated positions are intended to secure. There is a need to
understand these interests. We
cannot reach a win-win result without first understanding what 'win'
means to the other party. Each party to the conflict needs to understand
the genuine interests that the other party seeks to protect. This
may take time, care and patience but clearly there is a need for each
party to understand the other before attempting to make itself
understood. It is only when each party to the conflict acquires a clear
understanding of the interests that the other party seeks to protect
that the parties can together move to examine a win-win resolution of
the conflict. Once
these interests are clearly understood, the reasoning that led to the
stated position may have to be revisited with a view not to judge but to
discuss new frames. A win-win approach may then be directed to create,
in a step wise fashion, structures where the actual interests of each
party - without exception, and without compromise - may be secured.
A win-win solution is not a half way house where neither side wins. A
win-win solution is directed to secure the interests of both parties -
after all, that is why it is a win-win solution, and not a lose-lose
solution or a lose-win solution. Any
Tamil who seeks to persuade the Sinhala people of the justice of the
Tamil cause must first genuinely try to understand the reasons for
the stand taken against Tamil Eelam by successive Sri Lanka governments
and by the Sinhala people. By the same token, any Sinhalese who seeks to
persuade the Tamil people of the justice of the Sinhala stand must first
genuinely try to understand the reasons for the demand for Tamil Eelam
by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Tamil people. Here
there is a need to avoid the trap of separating the Sri Lanka government
from the Sinhala people and the LTTE from the Tamil people. The Sinhala
people are not a foolish people misled by designing politicians and
political bhikkus. The Sinhala people are as foolish as any other
people. And, like any other people, they create their leaders and
are responsible for the actions of their leaders. Political leaders are
not parachuted from the stratosphere. The same is true of the Tamil
people. Again, the Sinhala people are not an evil people. They are as
evil and as good as the Tamil people, or for that matter any other
people. And, not much is gained by either party demonising the other. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sinhala
interests Why then
is it that the Sinhala people are determined to resist any attempt
to divide the country? From time to time, several reasons have been
given and it is useful to examine these reasons, not so much with a view
to 'judging' whether these reasons are 'just', but with a view to
understanding the underlying interests which the Sinhala people seek to
protect and the real concerns which have led successive Sinhala
dominated Sri Lanka governments (without exception) to resist the
demand for Tamil Eelam. 1.Sri
Lanka is a too small a country to be divided 2.Tamil
Eelam will have control of more than 50% of the island's sea shores and
more than 30% of the land in the island 3.The discrimination that the Tamils claim to have suffered was simply taking away the privileges they had enjoyed under the British 4.The
Tamil people do not want Tamil Eelam, it is only a few terrorists and
fanatics who want it 5.Historically,
there is no Tamil homeland - the Sinhala people lived in the north and
east as well 6.The
Tamil can go to Tamil Nadu but the Sinhalese have no land other than Sri
Lanka 7.The
Tamils are invaders and immigrants and cannot claim a part of the
country - they are not the 'original' people 8.Tamil
Eelam will link with the Tamils in the plantations and invade parts of
the South 9.Tamil
Eelam will be a first step towards a pan Tamil state including
Tamil Nadu 10.An
independent Tamil Eelam state will threaten the existence of the Sinhala
Buddhist nation This
list of reasons is not meant to be exhaustive. However, the list may be
sufficient to reflect some of the stated concerns that the Sinhala
people may have in relation to the demand for Tamil Eelam. It
may be instructive to examine these reasons and determine whether
they reflect an actual interest that the Sinhala people seek to protect
or whether they are simply intended to serve as useful debating points
in a hypothetical 'court of justice'. Take
for instance the 'reason' that Sri Lanka is too small a
country to be divided. The fact is that there are many countries which
are smaller than Tamil Eelam - and the Sinhala people are well aware of
that fact. The real question is not whether Sri Lanka is 'too
small' to be divided, but what are interests of the Sinhala people that
would be put at risk, if such division took place? Would a smaller Sri
Lanka put at risk the economic well being of the Sinhala people and
if so how may that well being be protected? Again, would a smaller Sri
Lanka put at risk the security of the Sinhala people and if so how may
that security be protected? The
concern about control of 50% of the island's sea shores and 30% of the
land must be considered in the light of the fertility of the land
in the south and centre of the island, the tea, rubber and coconut
plantations in the south and the urban development of the capital,
Colombo and the Western Province. The truth is that the equities in
terms of economic resources are weighted heavily in favour of the
Sinhala south. But, again, these are not facts unknown to the Sinhala
people. What are the interests of the Sinhala people that would be put
at risk if 50% of the island's sea shores and 30% of the land mass
was in the control of Tamil Eelam? Can the percentages be made subject
to negotiation? Again, is it a matter of economics or security - or
both? The
argument that the Tamils do not want Tamil Eelam ignores the mandate
that S.J.V.Chelvanayagam received from the Tamil people in 1975 and his
short but historic statement on 7 February 1975: "Throughout
the ages the Sinhalese and Tamils in the country lived as distinct
sovereign people till they were brought under foreign domination. It
should be remembered that the Tamils were in the vanguard of the
struggle for independence in the full confidence that they also will
regain their freedom. We have for the last 25 years made every effort to
secure our political rights on the basis of equality with the Sinhalese
in a united Ceylon." "It is a regrettable fact that successive Sinhalese governments have used the power that flows from independence to deny us our fundamental rights and reduce us to the position of a subject people. These governments have been able to do so only by using against the Tamils the sovereignty common to the Sinhalese and the Tamils." "I
wish to announce to my people and to the country that I consider the
verdict at this election as a mandate that the Tamil Eelam nation should
exercise the sovereignty already vested in the Tamil people and become
free." It
also ignores the fact that at the 1977 general elections, the Tamil
United Liberation Front won a mandate for Tamil Eelam. The arithmetic of
that mandate is not the real issue. The fact is that the present armed
conflict exists because the Sinhala people do not want Tamil
Eelam - and are prepared to lose Sinhala lives to secure that objective. Again,
these are facts which are not unknown to the Sinhala people. The real
question that may need to be addressed is: what are the interests that
the Sinhala people are prepared to defend with their lives? It
should now have become apparent that the real concern that the Sinhala
people have is that an independent Tamil Eelam may become a focus
for a powerful pan Tamil nationalism and that this will threaten the
very existence of the Sinhala Buddhist nation in the island. Admittedly, the Sinhala people have their roots in the island of Sri Lanka - and they have no other land which they can claim as their own. Furthermore,
the Sinhala people are a minority in the region. This is a demographic
fact. This demographic fact is compounded by the memory of rule of the
Sinhala people by Tamil kings. The last King of Kandy signed his
surrender to the British in Tamil (and not in Sinhalese) and reportedly
the British secured the support of Sinhala feudal lords to
overthrow the King who had come from South India. We
cannot go forward by dismissing the fears of the Sinhala people as
'irrational' or by suggesting that they are simply the handiwork of
corrupt Sinhala politicians or 'evil' Buddhist priests. Nor should these
fears be dismissed simply as a consequence of the 'Maha Vamsa' mind set. After
all, why was it that the Mahavamsa came to be written in the way it was
- and not in some other way. The story about Dutugemenu reflected a
certain existing political reality - it did not 'create' that political
reality out of thin air. The fears of the Sinhala people spring
from geography and history and, more importantly, are related to today's
demographic reality in the Indian region. The existence of one million
Tamils in the plantations in central Sri Lanka and more than fifty
million Tamils (separated by a mere 20 miles of water) in Tamil Nadu is
no Mahavamsa myth. The
truth is that the Sinhala Buddhist national identity has grown in
opposition to the growth of the Tamil national identity. "Nationalism
... is an act of consciousness .. the mental life of man is as much
dominated by an ego-consciousness as it is by a group consciousness.
Both are complex states of mind at which we arrive through experiences
of differentiation and opposition, of the ego and the surrounding world,
of the we group and those outside the group" (Hans Kohn: The Idea
of Nationalism , A Study of its Origins and Background. New York. 1944) Again,
the Sinhala Buddhist national identity is not simply a function of
economics, as some Sinhala Marxists would have it. "Nationalism
has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and precisely for
that reason, has been largely elided, rather than confronted. How else
to account for the use, for over a century of the concept of the
'national bourgeoisie' without any serious attempt to justify
theoretically the relevance of the adjective? Why is this segmentation
of the bourgeoisie - a world class in so far as it is defined in terms
of the relations of productions - theoretically significant? (Benedict
Anderson - Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism - Verso, 1983) "Like
religion,..or any other great emotive force, nationalism is ambivalent,
and can escape very completely from a prescribed political channel. Even
in its origins, it was a complex phenomenon, deriving both from the
solidarity and from the divisions of society... " (Anthony D Smith
(Ed) Nationalist Movements - Article by V.Kiernan - Nationalist
Movements and Social Classes) The
question that any meaningful attempt at conflict resolution will need to
address is whether securing an undivided Sri Lanka is the only way in
which the real concerns of the Sinhala people may be protected.
------------------------------------------------------------------------ Tamil
interests Let
us now turn to the reasons that the LTTE and the Tamil people advance in
support of their demand for an independent Tamil Eelam. Because as much
as it is important for the Tamil people to understand the interests that
the Sinhala people seek to protect, equally, in so far as the Sri Lanka
government and the Sinhala people are concerned, there
is a need for them to understand the reasons which led the Tamil people
to demand Tamil Eelam and to take to arms to secure it. Some of the
reasons that have been advanced from time to time include the following:
1.Plantation
Tamils were disenfranchised to weaken Tamil influence in the legislature 2.The
Sinhala Only Act discriminated against Tamils in respect of
language and diminished their employment prospects 3.The
Tamil homeland was subjected to state sponsored Sinhala colonisation 4.Tamil
areas have not received resources for economic development 5.When
Tamils protested against discrimination, genocidal attacks were launched
on them 6.Sinhala
Buddhist fundamentalism has led Sinhala political leaders to break
agreements and pacts 7.The
Tamil people are ruled by a permanent alien Sinhala majority 8.Tamils
are a different people, with a different language and trace their
origins to different historical roots, and they have lived in the island
for as long as or longer than the Sinhala people 9.If democracy means rule of the people by the people, then no one people may rule another 10.Continuance
within the Sri Lanka state will lead to the destruction of the Tamil
Eelam nation Again,
though these reasons are not intended to be exhaustive, the list may be
sufficient to reflect some of the stated concerns that the Tamil people
have in relation to continuing to live within the confines of the
existing Sri Lankan state. Once
again, it will be useful to examine these reasons and determine whether
they reflects an actual interest that the Tamil people seek to protect
or whether they are simply intended to serve as useful debating points
in a hypothetical 'court of justice'. It
is true that the Tamil people seek to secure their language and
employment rights. It is true that they seek to prevent state
colonisation of their homeland. But, they seek to do this, in order that
they may protect their separate identity as a people. The Tamil
struggle is not about discrimination but about freedom from alien
rule by a permanent Sinhala majority within the confines of one state.
It is this permanent Sinhala rule which is evidenced by the fact that in
Sri Lanka, for five long decades since 1948, we have always had a
Sinhala Buddhist as the executive head of government. The
question is not even whether Sinhala rule was oppressive (though, in
fact it was). If the question was 'oppressive Sinhala rule', the answer
would be benevolent Sinhala rule. There may have been some who regarded
British rule as benevolent, but this did not prevent the struggle for
freedom from alien rule. It is as a free people, that the togetherness
of the Tamil people rooted in an ancient heritage and a rich language will
find vibrant expression. It is as a free people that they will be able
to nurture the growth of their children and their children’s children
to the fullness of their potential. The
bottom line is that the struggle of the Tamil people is about their
democratic right to rule themselves - and it is this right that they
seek to protect. If democracy means the rule of the people, by the
people and for people, then equally, no one people may rule
another. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Telescoping
two processes: independence and inter-dependence In
an important sense, the interest that each party to the conflict in the
island seeks to protect is the mirror image of the interest of the other
party. The Sinhala people seek to secure their national identity against
a Tamil majority in the region. The people of Tamil Eelam seek to secure
their own separate national identity within the island of Sri Lanka. The
Sinhala people fear rule by the Tamil majority in the region. The people
of Tamil Eelam fear rule by the Sinhala majority within the island of
Sri Lanka. The
question is whether the two peoples sitting together as equals cannot
agree upon political structures which protects each of their interests.
There may be a need to telescope two processes - one the creation of an
independent Tamil Eelam and the other the terms in which an independent
Tamil Eelam may associate with an independent Sri Lanka, so that
the national security of each may be protected and guaranteed. If
Germany and France were able to put in place such 'associate' structures
despite the suspicions and confrontations of two world wars, it should
not be beyond the capacity of Tamil Eelam and Sri Lanka to work out
structures, within which each independent state may remain free and
prosper, but at the same time pool sovereignty in certain agreed areas. Admittedly,
the negotiating process may be complex. In the case of Europe, the
European Union evolved over a number of years and was underpinned by
NATO. In the case of the conflict in the island of Sri Lanka, there may
be a need to secure the support of both India and the United States to
provide the necessary underpinning. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The
demand for Tamil Eelam is an inter-national question... The
demand for Tamil Eelam is an inter- national question and few will deny
that any meaningful attempt to resolve the conflict will need to involve
the LTTE, Sri Lanka, India and the United States. The political reality
is that both India and the United States have, from time to time,
involved themselves in the conflict - though, on occasion, that
involvement may have been layered (through proxies) in several ways. In
the case of India, the covert aid to Tamil militants during the period
up to 1986 ended with the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in
1987 and in 1989 with the banning of the LTTE as 'a threat to the
integrity of India'. In the case of the US, the Green Berets were
involved as recently as a few months ago on Sri Lankan soil and the US
has categorised the LTTE as a 'terrorist' organisation. The
shared interest of Sri Lanka, India and US is shown, for instance, by
the fact that each has banned the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
However, the significant differences in their underlying interests is
surfaced by the nature of the ban that each has imposed, and the stated
grounds for the action that each has taken. 1.In
the case of Sri Lanka, the ban is specific to the LTTE. The Emergency
(Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) Regulations No. 1 of
1998 provided that "The organisation styled as the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam is hereby proscribed". In addition, the 6th
Amendment to the Sri Lanka constitution had since 1983, rendered
unlawful any expression of support for the creation of an independent
Tamil Eelam state. Sri Lanka banned the LTTE both because it was an
armed movement and also because its goal of an independent Tamil Eelam
threatened the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. 2.The
Indian ban was imposed because India was of the view that LTTE's
objective for a homeland for all Tamils disrupted the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of India. The reason for the Indian ban was not
that the LTTE threatened the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Nor was
the Indian ban imposed on the ground that the LTTE was an armed movement
or a ‘terrorist’ organisation. Again, though the ban was imposed a
few months after the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, the ban itself did not
explicitly or implicitly state that the Rajiv Gandhi assassination had
anything to do with the ban. 3.Again,
the US ban was directed not only at the LTTE but to a number of other
organisations as well, which were labeled as ‘terrorist’. The US ban
was not imposed on the ground that the LTTE were seeking to establish an
independent state or that the LTTE struggle threatened the territorial
integrity of Sri Lanka. Neither was it on the ground that the LTTE's
objective for a homeland for all Tamils disrupted the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of India. As
long ago as 1983, President Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew
Brzezinski spelt out US foreign policy objectives for the year 2000: "....
the combination of demographic pressures and political unrest will
generate particularly in the third world, increasing unrest and
violence... The population of the world by the end of this century will
have grown to some 6 billion people.... moreover most of the increase
will be concentrated in the poorer parts of the world, with 85% of the
world's population by the end of this century living in Africa, Latin
America and the poorer parts of Asia.... Most
of the third world countries... are likely to continue to suffer from
weak economies and inefficient government, while their increasingly
literate, politically awakened, but restless masses will be more and
more susceptible to demagogic mobilisation on behalf of political
movements... it is almost a certainty that an increasing number of third
world states will come to possess nuclear weapons.... Terrorist
groups may also before very long try to advance their causes through a
nuclear threat... the problems confronting Washington in assuring US
national security will become increasingly complex..." (Zbigniew
Brzezinski - Power and Principle, published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1983) Here,
it is not without significance that it was during Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s period in office as National Security adviser, that the
United States began publishing its list of international terrorist
organisations. Additionally,
nuclear non proliferation is also an important plank of US foreign
policy and in the words of President Clinton, the US intends to ''weave
its non-proliferation strategy more deeply into the fabric of all its
relationships with the world's nations and institutions''. This has had
its impact on India's nuclear policy and its own security interests.
India not without reason, contends that whilst it will support nuclear
disarmament it will not support a 'nuclear non proliferation' treaty
that creates an elite nuclear club in perpetuity. Non alignment in
a multipolar world takes on a somewhat different coloration to that in a
bipolar one. 'Calibrated adjustment' is the name of the new approach. Again,
the US may not be unaware that whatever may be the short term calibrated
‘adjustments', in the longer term, stability may be achieved in the
Indian region only on the basis of a free association of the
separate nations of the sub continent. The US may therefore seek to
build up influence within struggles for national self determination both
as a way of monitoring and managing them and also as a useful addition
to its armoury in managing New Delhi. It
is within this matrix of power balances that any national liberation
struggle in the Indian region may be compelled to adopt its own
calibrated approach, both towards New Delhi and Washington. It is
therefore, important to recognise the differences in the underlying interests
(and policy objectives) of Sri Lanka, India and the United States - three
countries which are united in their opposition to the LTTE at the
present time. The
recent agreement (of 27 December 1998) between Sri Lanka and India
to work towards a free trade area in the Indian region, may be a pointer
(albeit, a small pointer) to that which may be the direction of the
future. The agreement is regarded as the precursor to a
seven-nation reduced tariff regime known as the South Asian Free Trade
Area (SAFTA), which is expected to get going by 2001. Apart from India
and Sri Lanka, SAFTA will include Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Maldives
and Bangladesh. Strange
as it may seem to some, the struggle for an independent Tamil state, is
not in opposition to many of the underlying interests of the parties
concerned with the conflict in the island - and that includes Sri Lanka,
India and the United States. "The
growing togetherness of the Tamil people, is but a step in the growth of
a larger unity. We know that in the end, national freedom can only be
secured by a voluntary pooling of sovereignties, in a regional, and
ultimately in a world context.... we recognise that our future lies with
the peoples of the Indian region and the path of a greater and a larger
Indian union is the direction of that future. It
is a union that will reflect the compelling and inevitable need for a
common market and a common defence and will be rooted in the common
heritage that we share with our brothers and sisters of not only Tamil
Nadu but also of India. It is a shared heritage that we freely
acknowledge and it is a shared heritage from which we derive
strength." (Nadesan Satyendra, Tamil Eelam, Kurds and Bhutan, July
1985 - quoted also in States, Nations, Sovereignty - Sri Lanka, India
and the Tamil Eelam Movement by Sumantra Bose) Whilst
the demand for an independent Tamil state is not negotiable, there may
be a need to explore fresh pathways concerning the terms on which an
independent Tamil Eelam may associate with an independent Sri Lanka.
And, at the end of all our exploration, we may, ofcourse, come back to
the beginning and truly know it for the first time... "Every
dispute has a history; we have been sending messages to them and they
have been sending messages to us, even if only by silence or by a
professed refusal to negotiate. Positions have been staked out.
Proposals have been made and rejected. One thing we know for sure: if
the conflict is continuing, whatever we have been saying and doing so
far has not worked. It has not produced the result we want, or we would
have turned our attention to other matters by now..." -
(Beyond Machiavelli - Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman & Andrea
Kupfer Schnieder, Harvard University Press, 1994) Nurture
the growing togetherness of more than 70 million Tamil people. If You
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