ASSESSMENTIndia's Principled Position: Framework of a solution
    From the very beginning, the Government of India made it abundantly clear that its
    efforts were at narrowing the differences between the two sides and at assisting them in
    reaching a solution which was within the framework of the unity and territorial integrity
    of Sri Lanka. It was recognized that the Tamils had legitimate demands and grievances and
    had faced discrimination for over 30 years. It was considered necessary and also possible
    to meet their legitimate aspirations through constitutional and structural changes. The
    problem of ethnic minorities has been faced by other countries such as Canada Belgium, UK,
    Switzerland, not to speak of India itself Different countries have found different
    solutions arising from their unique characteristics and based on the genius of their
    people. It was felt that Sri Lanka too should and could find a model of provincial
    autonomy. It was clear that any lasting settlement will have to be acceptable to all sides
    and would involve compromises.
    Indian leaders at the highest level have reiterated
    India's commitment and support to a solution which meets Tamil demands and aspirations
    within the framework of Sri Lankan unity and territorial integrity. Speaking in the Indian
    Parliament on August 12, 1983, Smt. Gandhi had said "I took the opportunity to
    reassure Mr. Jayewardene (H.W. Jayewardene) that India stands for the independence, unity
    and integrity of Sri Lanka. India does not interfere in the internal affairs of other
    countries. However, because of the historical, cultural and such other close ties between
    the peoples of the two countries, particularly between the Tamil community of Sri Lanka
    and us, India cannot remain, unaffected by such events there". On 6April,
    1984speakingin the Indian Parliament, the then External Affairs Minister, Shri P.V.
    Narasimha Rao said 'It is not merely a policy for Sri Lanka. We stand for peaceful
    settlements of disputes wherever and whenever they arise in whatever manner. These are
    some of the parameters of our policy. We do not want any secession. We are against
    secessionist trends in any country. So, these are the parameters subject to which our
    policy is made and pursued and, therefore, there is no question of my having compromise on
    this.'
    In 1985 speaking in the Parliament on 3rd May Prime
    Minister Rajiv Gandhi said "Our concern is for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The concern
    is not only of people in the South but it is the concern of everyone in India. We have to
    see that the refugees go back, go back in honour, go back in safety, go back with the
    security of expecting and getting full freedom to express themselves, to work, to live
    within the integrity of Sri Lanka. We have made our position clear many times on
    this". Within this framework India has consistently supported the Tamil demands and
    has deplored firmly and unequivocally the injustice done to them. The civilian death and
    destruction caused by violence, the atrocities against the Tamils, and the resort to a
    military option caused deep anguish and distress in India. These have been severely
    condemned and the solidarity with the victims of State oppression, expressed both in word
    and deed. India has also continued to shelter and provide basic amenities to over 1,30,000
    Tamil refugees.
    Double track policy of Sri Lanka Government
    The lack of firm political commitment, the vacillation, at times withdrawal from the
    accepted position and the two-track policy of undertaking military operations even while
    professing faith in negotiations, on the part of Sri Lanka's Government have contributed
    greatly to the failures in the mediation efforts. With a history of betrayals in the past
    there is a deep-seated distrust of Sinhala politicians among the Tamil people. They,
    therefore, are disinclined to accept that the Sri Lanka Government is committed to a fair
    and long4asting political settlement. Sri Lanka's Government has compounded their distrust
    and alienation by resorting to military measures at crucial phases of negotiations (in
    mid-August 1985 after the Thimpu talks, in early 1986 and in January 1987 after December
    19th proposals). The massive military onslaught mounted from the last week of May 1987
    with indiscriminate shelling, strafing and bombing from the sea, the air and army
    operations on land in the entire Jaffna peninsula resulting in loss of life and limb,
    damages to property and untold sufferings to the civilian population, has perhaps taken
    the situation to a point of no return and complete alienation of the Tamil population. It
    is already late, but it may not yet be too late to halt the military onslaught on the
    helpless civilian population of Jaffna peninsula and create conditions conducive to a
    return to the negotiating table. Going by past experience it may be a little too much to
    expect from the leadership of the Sri Lankan Government. But the time, the events, and the
    situation call for statesmanship and not partisan policies. One only hopes that the Sri
    Lankan Government realizes this. It is now or never. A population, even if it is an ethnic
    minority, can be subdued only for the time being but not subjugated forever.